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Abstract
Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases can be reduced by withdrawing
carbon from the atmosphere and sequestering it in soils and biomass. This report
analyzes the performance of alternative incentive designs and payment levels if
farmers were paid to adopt land uses and management practices that raise soil carbon
levels. At payment levels below $10 per metric ton for permanently sequestered
carbon, analysis suggests landowners would find it more cost effective to adopt
changes in rotations and tillage practices. At higher payment levels, afforestation
dominates sequestration activities, mostly through conversion of pastureland. Across
payment levels, the economic potential to sequester carbon is much lower than the
technical potential reported in soil science studies. The most cost-effective payment
design adjusts payment levels to account both for the length of time farmers are
willing to commit to sequestration activities and for net sequestration. A 50-percent
cost-share for cropland conversion to forestry or grasslands would increase seques-
tration at low carbon payment levels but not at high payment levels.
Keywords: Carbon sequestration, greenhouse gas mitigation, afforestation, conser-
vation tillage, no-till, incentive design, leakage, carbon stock, and permanence. 
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Summary
Strategies that have been proposed to mitigate global climate change typically
focus on reducing energy-related emissions of greenhouse gases (including carbon
dioxide) into the atmosphere. But atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
also can be reduced by withdrawing carbon from the atmosphere and storing, or
sequestering, it in soils and biomass. In examining the economics of sequestering
carbon in the U.S. farm sector through changes in agricultural land use and
management practices, this study focuses on two questions:
● How much of the estimated “technical” potential for carbon sequestration
is economically feasible?
● How cost effective are alternative designs for incentive payments that
might be used to encourage carbon-sequestering activities?
Model-based findings reflect the provision of financial incentives to landowners
for sequestering carbon through changes in land use (converting cropland to forest
or grassland) and cropland management practices (adopting conservation tillage or
alternative crop rotations):
● Agriculture can provide low-cost opportunities to sequester additional 
carbon in soils and biomass. At a price of $10 per metric ton for permanently
sequestered carbon, the ERS model estimates that from 0.4 to 10 MMT of car-
bon could be sequestered annually from adoption of the land-use changes or
management practices analyzed; and at $125 per ton, from 72 to 160 MMT
could be sequestered, enough to offset 4 to 8 percent of gross U.S. emissions of
greenhouse gases in 2001. 
● The different sequestration activities studied become economically feasible
at different carbon prices. The model predicted that farmers would adopt crop-
land management (primarily conservation tillage) at the lowest carbon price, $10
per metric ton permanently sequestered carbon, and would convert land to forest
as the price rose to $25 and beyond. The model predicted farmers in most
regions would not convert cropland to grassland up through a $125 carbon price
(in the absence of other incentives, such as Conservation Reserve Program pay-
ments), in part because conversion to afforestation was more profitable with its
higher sequestration rate per acre. These estimates are comparable with esti-
mates in earlier studies.
● The estimated economic potential to sequester carbon is lower than previ-
ously estimated technical possibilities. Soil scientists have estimated that
increased adoption of conservation tillage on U.S. cropland has the technical
potential to sequester as much as 107 million metric tons (MMT) additional car-
bon. The ERS model estimates economic potential by factoring into farmers’
adoption decisions the tradeoff between the additional costs of sequestering
practices, relative to the additional returns from the per ton carbon payments. We
estimate that farmers could sequester up to an additional 28 MMT by adopting
conservation tillage on additional lands at the top carbon price we studied, $125
per ton. For the other activities studied—afforestation and, particularly, for 
conversion to grassland—the estimated economic potential also was less than 
the literature estimates of technical potential.vi ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
● Incremental sequestration from agricultural activities can continue for
decades. Conversion to conservation tillage could sequester additional soil carbon
for 20-30 years, at which point a new equilibrium level of soil carbon would be
attained. But carbon may be released relatively rapidly if farmers shift back to 
conventional tillage. Additional sequestration from afforestation may continue for
many more decades, depending on region, species of trees, and harvest decisions.  
These findings have implications for policy:
● Payments for carbon sequestration may exceed their value if sequestration
is not permanent. To have the same greenhouse gas mitigation value as a unit
of carbon emissions reduction, a unit of additional carbon sequestration must
remain stored in soils or biomass permanently. If a program makes per ton pay-
ments equal to the value of permanent sequestration (“asset” payments), over-
payments will occur if subsequent changes in land use or management practices
release carbon back into the atmosphere—unless compensation is adjusted for
the releases. “Rental” payment mechanisms, which pay farmers to store carbon
for specific periods by maintaining carbon-sequestering practices, can help avoid
this problem—particularly for contract renewals after the period when a new
equilibrium level of soil carbon is reached and no more carbon is being added to
the soil.
● An incentive system that includes both payments for carbon sequestration
and charges for carbon emissions may be much more cost effective than a 
system with payments only. For example, at a carbon price of $125 per ton of
permanently sequestered carbon, changes in tillage practices account for 7 MMT
of additional sequestered carbon with a rental payment system that includes both
payments and charges. Annual government expenditures for storage of this carbon
during the 15-year contract period total $300 million. In contrast, when the incen-
tives include only carbon payments, a price of $125 per ton results in half the
sequestered carbon (3.5 MMT), while annual government expenditures increase
tenfold to $1.5 billion. 
● Adding a cost-share subsidy does not appear to improve the cost effectiveness
of incentive systems. A 50-percent cost-share for cropland conversion to forestry
or grasslands would increase sequestration at low carbon payment levels but not at
high payment levels. The implications for cost per ton are minimal.Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 1
Chapter 1: Introduction
Increasing the quantity of carbon sequestered—or
stored—in soils and biomass is an alternative to
reducing emissions of carbon and other greenhouse
gases (GHG) in an overall strategy to mitigate global
climate change and its negative economic and environ-
mental effects. In February 2002, the President
directed the Secretary of Agriculture to develop
recommendations for incentives designed to encourage
owners of agricultural and forest lands to adopt
production practices and land uses that extract carbon
from the atmosphere and sequester it in terrestrial
sinks. This report provides information useful for eval-
uating the economic implications of several frequently
discussed designs for incentive programs that might be
used to expand such land uses and production prac-
tices in the U.S. farm sector. 
Recent studies indicate that U.S. agricultural soils are
now being managed as a modest carbon sink—
accounting for net sequestration of 4 million metric
tons (MMT) of carbon annually (U.S. EPA, 2003).1 It
is generally believed that these soils could be managed
to store significantly more carbon. Sperow et al.
(2003) estimate that U.S. croplands could be managed
to sequester an additional 60-70 MMT of carbon per
year. Lal et al (1998) put this figure at 75-208 MMT.
Follett et al. (2001) estimate that U.S. grazing lands
could be managed to sequester an additional 29-110
MMT of carbon per year. These studies do not
consider the option of sequestering carbon by shifting
marginal croplands and grazing lands to forest. Hence,
even in the absence of afforestation, the estimates in
these studies suggest it may be technically possible to
sequester an additional 89-318 MMT of carbon annu-
ally on U.S. croplands and grazing lands. Based on
2001 emissions, this level of carbon sequestration
would offset between 5 and 17 percent of gross U.S.
GHG emissions.2
From a policy standpoint, it is important to note that the
carbon sequestration assessments of Sperow et al., Lal et
al., and Follett et al. do not take into account the cost to
store the additional carbon in agricultural soils. The
marginal cost of sequestering additional units of carbon
would be expected to rise as the quantity sequestered
increases. Consequently, the cost of increasing the
carbon content of all agricultural soils to the levels
suggested by these studies could be very high. Further, it
may be more cost effective to sequester carbon by
changing the use of some lands now engaged in
commodity production, for example, by shifting crop-
land or pasture to forest. 
This study explores the economic potential of the U.S.
farm sector to store additional carbon, and the resulting
implications for land-use changes and the economic
well-being of producers and consumers. To assess this
potential, we adapt the U.S. Agricultural Sector Model
(USMP) to include sequestration and emissions parame-
ters associated with switching into and out of land uses
and production practices that build carbon levels in soils
and biomass. The cropland management and grassland
conversion parameters are based on the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) GHG inventory
procedures (1997). Forestry parameters are from U.S.
Forest Service estimates (Birdsey, 1996). With this infor-
mation as a base, we incorporate incentive payments for
afforesting croplands and pasture, shifting cropland to
permanent grasses, and increasing the use of production
practices (particularly no-till) and rotations that raise
soil-carbon levels. We run model simulations reflecting
four alternative payment structures and six alternative
payment levels for additional carbon sequestration from
adoption of these activities. 
Economics of Sequestering Carbon 
in the U.S. Agricultural Sector
Jan Lewandrowski, Mark Peters, Carol Jones, 
Robert House, Mark Sperow, Marlen Eve, and Keith Paustian 
1 For perspective, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(2003) estimates 2001 net sequestration in U.S. forests at 207
MMT of carbon. 
2 For 2001, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2003) esti-
mates gross U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases at 1,892 MMTCE,
including carbon emissions of 1,580 MMT. 2 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
To provide context, we first review the GHG emis-
sions profiles of the United States and the U.S. farm
sector, and existing evidence on the technical poten-
tial of farm-sector activities to sequester carbon. We
then discuss two key issues in establishing compara-
bility between the GHG mitigation options of carbon
sequestration and carbon emissions reduction—
“permanence” and “C-stock equilibrium.” The
permanence issue refers to the potentially temporary
GHG mitigation effect of carbon sequestration rela-
tive to GHG emissions reduction, and the C-stock
equilibrium issue refers to the finite period of time
that terrestrial systems can accumulate additional
carbon under a new management system. Key issues
in incentive design include defining the scope of the
incentives and the scope of the GHG accounting,
choosing the carbon measure (net or gross emis-
sions) on which payments are based, and selecting
the set of farmers eligible to receive incentive
payments. The resolution of these design issues have
important implications for the cost effectiveness of
any incentives to store additional carbon in agricul-
tural soils and biomass and the degree to which
those incentives may encourage responses that result
in offsetting carbon emissions. 
U.S.Total Emissions and 
Agricultural Sector Emissions 
of Greenhouse Gases
The decades-long upward trend in GHG emissions
for the United States as a whole and for the U.S.
agricultural sector continued during the recent period
1990-2001 (table 2.1). Gross emissions for 2001 are
estimated at 1,892 million metric tons carbon equiv-
alent (MMTCE) (U.S. EPA, 2003), which implies an
average annual increase of 1.1 percent during 1990-
2001. Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions represent 82
percent of all U.S. GHG emissions in 2001. Al-
though not evident in the table, about 98 percent of
gross CO2 emissions are attributed to the combustion
of fossil fuels. The other major GHGs, methane
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), represent 9 percent
(CH4) and 6 percent (N2O) of total 2001 U.S. GHG
emissions on a carbon-equivalent basis.1, 2
Agricultural sector emissions of carbon dioxide,
methane, and nitrous oxide account for about 9 percent
of all U.S. GHG emissions. However, the pattern of
emissions in agriculture is quite different than in other
sectors. Carbon dioxide emissions represent a small
share of total agricultural GHG emissions, while the
shares of nitrous oxide (60 percent) and methane (31
percent) are far more significant. In terms of agricultural
activities, soil management emits the greatest amount of
GHG, with an estimated 80 MMTCE of nitrous oxide
emissions (primarily from applications of nitrogen
fertilizers) (fig. 2.1). In contrast, soil management
currently represents a “net sink” for carbon, seques-
tering 4 MMTCE in 2001. Thus, soil management emits
a net total of 76 MMTCE. Livestock activities generate
the next two highest emissions levels in agriculture,
with enteric fermentation (i.e., digestion by ruminant
livestock) emitting 31 MMTCE of methane and manure
management emitting 11 MMTCE of methane and 5
MMTCE of nitrous oxide. Fuel combustion on farms,
accounting for 14 MMTCE of carbon dioxide emis-
sions, and rice production, accounting for 2 MMTCE of
methane, are the next highest GHG-emitting activities. 
Potential Activities for Mitigation of GHG
Emissions in the U.S. Agricultural Sector
For cropland, the activities with the highest potential 
for storing carbon are afforestation, conversion of crop-
land to perennial grasses, and switching from conven-
tional tillage to conservation tillage (particularly no-till)
Chapter 2: Conceptual Issues
1 GHGs vary in their contribution to global warming. To make
cross-gas comparisons, the IPCC developed the concept of global
warming potential (GWP) values. GWP values (on a mass basis)
are expressed relative to CO2 and for a 100-year time horizon. CO2
is assigned a value of 1, CH4 a value of 23, and N2O a value of
296 (IPCC, 2001b). 
2 U.S. EPA (2003) presents emissions in teragrams of CO2 equiva-
lents (Tg CO2 Eq). Since 1 Tg = 1 MMT, we can see that multiply-
ing TgCO2 Eq by 0.2727 yields MMTCE, million metric tons of
carbon equivalent. Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 3
(fig. 2.2). These activities also rank relatively high in
sequestration per acre—1, 2, and 5, respectively—
among the cropland activities listed in table 2.2. Activi-
ties with lower carbon-storing potentials include
changing crop rotations, expanding the use of winter
cover crops, eliminating periods of summer fallow,
changing fertilizer management, using more organic soil
amendments (i.e., manure, sludge, and byproducts),
improving irrigation methods, shifting land to conserva-
tion buffers, and restoring wetlands. 
For grazing lands, afforestation ranks highest in both
per acre carbon sequestration and total potential
carbon sequestration. Generally, pasture-management
activities have high per acre sequestration rates but
low total carbon-storing potentials. This finding
reflects the comparatively limited areas of pastureland
in the United States on which these GHG-mitigating
activities are, or could be, practiced. For example,
Follett et al. (2001) estimate current levels of pasture
management at 32 million acres using additional
manure applications, 6 million acres planted with
improved grass varieties, and 25 million acres using
improved grazing practices. For each activity, potential
expansion is estimated at 13 million acres. Conversely,
rangeland management has a low per acre sequestra-
tion rate but a high total carbon-storing potential
because the contiguous United States has about 260
million acres of rangeland.
Outside of agricultural soil management, the next
greatest sources of farm-sector GHG emissions are
Table 2.1—Selected U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
19901 995 2000 2001
Million metric tons carbon equivalent
Total U.S. emissions:
Carbon 1,364.61 ,454.81 ,604.51 ,580.4
Methane 175.6 177.3 167.3 165.2
Nitrous oxide 108.4 117.5 117.2 115.8
HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 25.72 7 .1 33.0 30.3
Total U.S. gross emissions 1,674.41 ,776.81 ,922.01 ,891.7
Land-use change and forestry carbon sequestration*- 2 92.6- 2 90.2 -227.6 -228.6
Total U.S. GHG net emissions** 1,381.9 1,486.61 ,694.41 ,663.1
Agricultural sector emissions:
Carbon:
Fossil fuel combustion 12.61 5 .51 3.71 3.7
Total - agricultural sources 12.61 5 .51 3.71 3.7
Percent of U.S. total carbon emissions 2.12 .22 .12 .1
Agricultural soils - sequestration*- 3.6- 4 .1- 3.8- 4 .1
Percent of U.S. total carbon sequestration 1.21 .41 .71 .8
Methane:
Enteric fermentation3 2.2 33.5 31.6 31.3
Manure management8 .5 9.9 10.41 0 .6
Rice cultivation 1.9 2.12 .02 .1
Crop residue burning 0.20 .20 .20 .2
Total - agricultural sources 42.84 5 .74 4 .3 44.2
Percent of U.S. total methane 24.42 5 .82 6 .52 6 .8
Nitrous oxide:
Soil management7 3.07 7 .58 0 .3 80.3
Manure management4 .44 .54 .9 4.9
Crop residue burning 0.10 .10 .10 .1
Total - agricultural sources 77.68 2 .28 5 .48 5 .4
Percent of U.S. total nitrous oxide 71.56 9.9 72.9 73.7
Total U.S. agriculture GHG net emissions** 133.05 143.44 143.47 143.39
*  Carbon sequestered as a result of agricultural and forestry activities, involving both land-use change and land management.
Negative values imply sequestration.
** Total carbon-equivalent emissions minus land-use change and forestry carbon sequestration, in million metric tons carbon equivalent.
Source:U .S. Environmental Protection Agency (2003). See http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/emissions4 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
livestock enteric fermentation (methane) and manure
management (methane and nitrous oxide). The tech-
nical and economic options for reducing emissions
from these sources appear to be limited at this time.
Substituting biofuels for fossil fuels on a continuous
basis could reduce the rate of increase in atmospheric
carbon over time. While every unit of fossil fuel
consumed emits new stocks of carbon into the atmos-
phere, biofuel emissions are at least partially derived
from recycling carbon already in the atmosphere via
the production of biofuel crops.3 Lal et al. (1998) esti-
mate the average per acre reduction in net carbon
emissions associated with biofuel crops at 1.42 metric
tons (mt) for fuel substitution and 0.4 mt in additional
soil carbon. They estimate a total GHG-mitigation
potential of 39 MMT per year from shifting 10 million
acres of idle cropland into biofuel crop production. 
Comparing Reductions in Carbon 
Emissions With Increases in 
Carbon Sequestration
Conceptual discussions in the climate change literature
often acknowledge that a unit of carbon emissions
reduction and a unit of carbon sequestration may have
very different contributions to net GHG mitigation
over time. Studies cite two reasons for this variance in
effect. First, to be equivalent with emissions reduc-
tions, carbon sequestration must be maintained for a
period equal to the time emitted carbon remains in the
atmosphere, which is referred to as “permanence.”4
Second, after undergoing a change from one manage-
ment practice to another (e.g., from conventional
Figure 2.1
Agricultural emissions and carbon sequestration
in 2001 by activity
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3 Bioenergy crops include corn (used to produce ethanol), soy-
beans (used to produce biodiesel), switch grass (used to generate
electricity), and several fast-growing tree species (used to generate
electricity). With the first three crop types, the carbon would be
recycled in about a year. For tree species, the recycle time may be
5-10 years. Also, energy is an input in the production of ethanol
and biodiesel. Carbon emissions related to this energy use would
need to be accounted for in calculating the net GHG emissions
reductions associated with increasing the use of these products. 
Figure 2.2
Estimated potential carbon sequestration
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4 A 100-year time horizon is frequently employed, for example, in
the IPCC calculation of global warming potential by EPA in its
GHG inventory (U.S. EPA 2003, p. ES-9).Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 5
tillage to conservation tillage), terrestrial systems tend
to move to new equilibrium carbon levels over time.
Terrestrial systems then accumulate additional carbon
from activity changes for a finite period, until they
reach a new “C-stock equilibrium.”5 In empirical
work, the treatment of permanence and C-stock equi-
librium can greatly affect the economic analysis of
carbon sequestration incentives. Many previous studies
have simply treated carbon sequestration and emis-
sions reductions as being equivalent—implicitly or
explicitly assuming that any sequestration induced by
incentives will be permanent. 
Temporary Versus Permanent 
Terrestrial Sequestration 
To illustrate the potential differences in GHG mitigation
between emissions reduction and carbon sequestration,
we use an example of a farm under one baseline emis-
Table 2.2—Estimated potential annual carbon sequestration for selected changes in land use and 
production practices in U.S. agriculture 
Land-use change or Estimated per Total potentialI ncluded in 
management practicea cre sequestrations e questrationS ource this analysis 
Mt per acre MMT Per acre/total potential
Cropland:
Land-use changes:
Afforestation of cropland1, 2 0.79 - 1.72 83 - 181 Birdsey (1996)/footnote 2  Yes
Croplands shifted to perennial grasses1, 2 0.25 - 0.51  26 - 54 Eve et al. (2000)/footnote 2Y es
Conservation buffers3 0.13 - 0.25  1 - 2 Footnote 3/Lal et al. (1998) No4
Restoration of wetlands5 0.10 5 Lal et al./see footnote 4   No
Production practice changes:
Conservation tillage and residue 
management6 0.09 - 0.18 35 -107 Eve et al./Lal et al. Yes
Improved crop rotations and winter 
cover crops 0.04 - 0.12  5 - 15 Lal et al. Yes
Elimination of summer fallow 0.08 1 - 3 Lal et al. Yes
Improved fertilizer management0 .02 - 0.06 6 - 18 Lal et al.N o 
Use of organic manure and byproducts7 0.20 - 0.50  3 - 9 Follett et al. (2001)/Lal et al.N o
Improved irrigation management0 .04 5 - 11 Lal et al.N o
Grazing land:
Afforestation of pasture 0 .73 - 2.09 8 - 22 Birdsey/footnote 2Y es
Rangeland management0 .05 - 0.15 5 - 16 Follett et al.N o
Pasture management:
Improved use of fertilizers 0.10 - 0.20 2 - 4  Follett et al.N o
Use of organic manure 0.20 - 0.50 3 - 9 Follett et al.N o
Planting of improved species 0.10 - 0.301  -  3 Follett et al.N o
Grazing management0 .30 - 1.30 5 - 20  Follett et al.N o
1 Estimated average annual carbon sequestration over first 15 years of growth.
2 Moulton and Richards (1990) identify 105.5 million acres of cropland and 10.6 million acres of pasture where erosion exceeds the 
erosion tolerance rate. The total technical potential for afforestation assumes a complete conversion of these lands to trees.The total 
technical potential for grasses assumes a complete conversion of the 105.5 million acres of cropland to perennial grasses.The technical 
potential sequestration values are obtained by multiplying these acreages by the associated per acre sequestration rates.
3 Conservation buffers are vegetated strips 5-50 meters in width used to reduce water pollution and erosion.The per acre values shown 
here are derived from the total values from Lal et al. (1998) and their assumption that 7.9 million acres of conservation buffers will be in 
place by 2020.
4 Activities were omitted from the analysis when there was a lack of farm-level data on adoption cost.W i thout such data, it is not possible to
assess the net returns associated with undertaking an activity relative to alternative production possibilities.
5 Heimlich and Claassen (1998) estimate that there are 47.4 million acres of former wetlands and cropped wetlands that are suitable for 
restoration.The total potential sequestration is derived by multiplying the per acre sequestration from Lal et al.b y 47.4 million acres.
6 Per acre sequestration rates here assume conversion from conventional tillage to no-till.
7 Per acre sequestration is Follett et al.'s (2001) estimate for application of manure on pasture.
Source:L isted in table.
5 In the literature, this concept has often been erroneously referred
to as “saturation.” In soil science, saturation refers to an ultimate
limit for the ability of soils to stabilize organic carbon irrespective
of management change (Six et al., 2002). This true saturation level
is likely several times greater than the total carbon found in most
agricultural soils and is thus not a limiting condition for soil car-
bon sequestration in the near term.6 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
sions scenario and two GHG mitigation scenarios—one
assuming a decrease in farm fuel use (i.e., an emissions-
reduction activity) and the other assuming a shift to no-
till (i.e., a carbon-sequestering activity). For simplicity,
we assume that each activity lasts 4 years and that all
carbon stored as a result of shifting to no-till is released
to the atmosphere when conventional tillage is
resumed.6 In the baseline scenario, the farm emits 10 mt
of carbon annually (table 2.3). The first mitigation
scenario assumes that the farmer accepts a payment to
decrease fuel use. The decrease in fuel use reduces
carbon emissions by 1 metric ton for each year the
program is in effect. Furthermore, the reduction in the
stock of atmospheric carbon achieved during the 4 years
the program is in effect remains even after the program
ends and both annual fuel use and related carbon emis-
sions return to baseline levels (i.e., 10 mt per year). In
this sense, activities that reduce emissions—even those
with a finite duration—create “permanent” GHG-miti-
gation benefits. 
In the second mitigation scenario, the farmer accepts a
payment to shift from conventional tillage to no-till for
a period of 4 years. When the program stops, the
farmer switches back to conventional tillage. In each
year that the farmer uses no-till, 1 metric ton of carbon
is sequestered in the soil. However, when the land is
returned to conventional tillage at the start of year 5,
the carbon added to the soil as a result of using no-till
is released back to the atmosphere. So the stock of
atmospheric carbon is temporarily lowered by the use
of no-till but shifts back to the baseline accumulation
path in year 5. Hence, the “temporary” GHG mitiga-
tion benefits gained from 4 years of sequestration
activity are only a portion of the “permanent” benefits
gained from the 4 years of emissions reduction. 
Generally, for a unit of carbon sequestered in soil or
biomass in year t to have the same climate change miti-
gation effect as a similar unit of emissions reduction in
year t (and to be of equal mitigation value), the unit
sequestered must remain in the soil or biomass for a
period of about 100 years. In agricultural studies with
one decision point, this means either assuming that
sequestered carbon is stored permanently in sinks or
designing the incentive as a “rental” payment, based on
the duration of the rental commitment period. Carbon-
sequestration studies typically specify payment struc-
tures that require participants to commit to sequestration
activities for periods of at least 15-20 years. Such
commitment periods, however, are substantially shorter
than the time carbon remains in the atmosphere, leaving
the temporary-permanent ton equivalency issue 
unresolved.
The scenarios in the example assume a modeling frame-
work with a single decision point. In a framework that
allows for multiple decision points through time, a third
option is available: linking payments and charges to a
long-term, real-time accounting system for sequestration
and emissions. In this setup, farmers can receive
payments when adopting activities that reduce net emis-
sions and be charged when adopting activities that
increase emissions. However, most empirical studies of
the farm sector’s potential to sequester carbon employ
static modeling frameworks with one-time decision-
making. In such cases, analysts need to state clearly
whether they are assuming farmers continue or cease
sequestration activities at the end of the commitment
6 This assumption is probably somewhat extreme for most real
world situations but represents a reasonable simplification. Soil
scientists generally agree that a large majority—but not all—of the
carbon sequestered in U.S. soils as a result of converting conven-
tionally tilled cropland to conservation tillage or grasses for a
period of several years would be released to the atmosphere rela-
tively quickly when conventional tillage resumes. Scientific studies
that estimate such losses are scarce, but several studies on related
topics support this view. In a study of soils in Lower Saxony, Ger-
many, that had been managed with conservation tillage for 20
years, Stockfisch et al. (1999) found that all of the associated
increase in soil organic matter was lost with a single application of
conventional tillage. In a study of Wisconsin cropland that had
been planted to grasses for several years, Lindstrom et al. (1998)
found that the associated soil erosion benefits disappeared rapidly
with resumption of conventional tillage. Finally, studies have
demonstrated relatively large releases of CO2, termed a CO2
“burp,” from soils in the period just after intensive tillage
(Reicosky et al., 1997; and Reicosky, 1997). 
Table 2.3—Hypothetical net carbon emissions 
from reducing farm fuel use or expanding
no-till for a 4-year period
Year Net
emissions
Activity 1 2 3 45 5 - y r total
Metric tons
Baseline emissions 10 10 10 10 10 50
Change from baseline 
emissions from
mitigation activities
Reduce fuel use -1 -1 -1 -1 0 46
Expand no-till -1 -1 -1 -1 +4 50
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 7
period. More importantly, any payment for a unit of
carbon sequestration needs to accurately reflect the net
GHG mitigation achieved relative to an equivalent unit
reduction in carbon emissions. 
Carbon Stock Equilibration in 
Terrestrial Systems 
Organic carbon is maintained in soils through a dynamic
process. Plants convert carbon dioxide into tissue during
photosynthesis; after a plant dies, a portion of the stored
carbon is left behind in the soil by decomposing plant
residue and a larger portion is emitted back into the
atmosphere. Decomposition rates tend to be proportional
to the amount of organic matter in the soil. Hence, over
time and under relatively constant environmental and
management conditions, rates of carbon additions and
emissions tend to equilibrate and the amount of organic
carbon in soils stabilizes at a constant, or steady-state,
level (i.e., the C-stock equilibrium). If the relationship
between additions and losses changes due to a change in
soil management, the soil will gradually move to a new
C-stock equilibrium. For example, if a shift from
conventional tillage to reduced tillage increases the
amount of crop residues returned to the soil and/or
decreases the decomposition rate of organic matter, soil
carbon will increase over time until a higher C-stock
equilibrium is reached. Typically, the absolute gains in
carbon per unit of time will diminish as the stock
approaches the new equilibrium. Further increases after
this point would require additional changes in manage-
ment (e.g., switching to no-till). 
Carbon stocks and potential rates of accumulation vary
significantly across ecosystems with land use (e.g.,
forest, grassland, or cropland), management practices
(e.g., tillage system, crop rotation, use of fallow and
cover crops, nutrient applications, and irrigation
management), geographic location, and local environ-
mental factors (e.g., climate and soil characteristics).
Due to past management practices, most agricultural
soils have relatively depleted stocks of soil carbon,
compared with native ecosystems, and thus can readily
respond to improved management. Soil science studies
generally find that agricultural ecosystems could be
managed to accumulate additional soil carbon for
periods of 15-60 years (U.S. EPA, 1991; Paustian et al.,
1998; Dumanski et al., 1998; Bruce et al., 1998; and
West and Post, 2002). For example, in summarizing
more than 67 long-term agricultural experiments, West
and Post find that it may take 23-30 years for soils to
achieve a new C-stock equilibrium following a shift
from conventional tillage to no-till, with the highest
annual increments to soil carbon occurring between
years 5 and 10. For shifts to crop rotations that enhance
soil carbon (e.g., eliminating fallow periods or including
hay in continuous rotation systems), soils may not
approach a new equilibrium for 40-60 years.
In forest ecosystems, newly planted pine forests in the
Southern United States tend to reach C-stock equilib-
rium after about 90 years, with maximum accumulation
rates occurring between 15 and 25 years (Birdsey, 1996).
New ponderosa pine and douglas fir forests in the West
take more than 120 years to reach this equilibrium, with
maximum accumulation rates occurring between 35 and
60 years. Figure 2.3 presents an average time profile of
carbon sequestration for an acre of cropland in the
Southeast after conversion to fully stocked southern pine
under average management intensity. Carbon accumula-
tion over the first 5 years is relatively modest (averaging
0.91 mt per year) but grows at an increasing rate over a
period of 15 years. Between years 10 and 15, the
average annual sequestration rate is three times higher
than it is over the first 5 years. A lengthy period of posi-
tive but declining sequestration rates follows year 15.
Assuming no timber harvests, the system reaches its C-
stock equilibrium of 113.2 mt per acre after about 90
years. Of the carbon in the system, about 72.3 mt are
contained in trees, 33.6 mt are contained in soil, and the
balance is stored in understory vegetation and litter.7
The C-stock equilibrium issue has two important
implications for empirical analyses of the economic
potential to sequester carbon in the farm sector. First,
the finite periods of time in which terrestrial systems
can accumulate additional carbon place a finite limit
on the GHG-mitigation potential of any carbon-
sequestering activity at any given location. In contrast,
an emissions-reduction activity will continue to reduce
emissions relative to a pre-activity baseline every year
the activity is maintained. Second, because annual
carbon accumulation eventually will decline toward
zero, incentive payments based on annual increments
of carbon sequestration will eventually fall to zero. In
empirical work then, it is important to be clear about
the modeling assumptions regarding landowner
responses when sequestration payments fall to zero.
7 If the trees are harvested, most of the carbon contained in
removed biomass and logging residues, and some of the soil car-
bon, is returned to the atmosphere within a few years. The excep-
tion is the carbon stored in long-lived wood products (e.g., furni-
ture and structures). 8 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
Similarly, it is important to be clear about the assump-
tions regarding the actions landowners will take at the
end of a commitment period, even if the new C-stock
equilibrium has not been reached—because in the
absence of a subsequent contract period, payments
again fall to zero.
Defining Alternative Payment Structures To
Address the Permanence Issue
Our discussions of permanence and C-stock equilibrium
highlight the need to establish an equivalency between a
unit of sequestered carbon and a unit of emissions
reduction—both for conducting empirical analyses of
carbon sequestration incentives and for designing
carbon-sequestration policies. To that end, we develop a
rental payment incentive and define a rental value for a
commitment period. A series of rental contract
payments for sequestering a ton of carbon through time
will be equivalent, in present discounted value terms,
with the asset price per ton of net emissions reduction
or permanent carbon sequestration. 
We employ a carbon accounting system based on
metric tons of carbon stored per year, over defined
(commitment) time periods. If adoption of a given
sequestration activity results in an average annual
addition to soil carbon during the contract period of s
mt, the metric tons of carbon sequestered in the soil
relative to baseline in years 1, 2, 3, and n are, respec-
tively s,2 s,3 s, and ns.8 For simplicity, we abstract
from the longrun decay function of atmospheric
carbon and assume an infinite time horizon for the
atmospheric impacts of emissions (and so, too, of
emissions reductions). If we make the simplifying
assumption of a constant value (or payment level) for
emissions reduction,9 we can think of the rental
payments for temporary sequestration in terms of the
simple annuity formula. We denote the payment for 1
metric ton of sequestration for 1 year (paid in the year
of sequestration) as a and define it as:
(1) a = rP
where  P = payment for permanent reduction 
in carbon emissions of 1 mt, and
r = discount rate 
In equation 1, the value of a metric ton of temporary
sequestration for 1 year is the value of a metric ton of
permanent emissions reduction, P, discounted by the
factor r. With this payment structure, payments do not
cease when land in a given use or production practice
8 We adopt an annual average framework because the IPCC
sequestration parameters we employ for soil represent annual aver-
ages over a 20-year period, and the cost parameters have been
annualized as well. This is a reasonable simplification because the
decision is for the commitment period, not a year-by-year basis. 
9 This is not a necessary condition—the formula can be adjusted
readily for a varying carbon price. 









Source:  Birdsey (1996).
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reaches C-stock equilibrium because the payments are
for carbon storage above baseline levels, not for new
additions to the carbon stock. Payments cease only
when the carbon is released back into the atmos-
phere—for example, when a farmer stops using no-till
and returns to conventional tillage. Analogously, if a
metric ton of carbon is sequestered and held for 10
years, then the present discounted value (PDV) in year
1 would be:
where the discount factor applied to permanent emis-
sions reduction is (1 - e-10r). 
Next, consider the discount factor for a pattern of
temporary carbon sequestration accumulated over a
fixed commitment period of J years (where J is less
than the time needed to reach C-stock equilibrium)
relative to a matched time path of permanent emis-
sions reductions. For simplicity, assume that the rate of
carbon accumulation over the commitment period is 1
mt per year. Hence, for the commitment period, the
time path of carbon sequestration is 1 mt in year 1, 2
mt in year 2, etc. In the last year of the program, the
amount sequestered will be J mt. In contrast, emissions
reductions of 1 metric ton per year will have an essen-
tially permanent effect on the atmosphere. Hence, the
ratio of the value of the temporary sequestration rela-
tive to the value of the permanent emissions reductions
during the same time period is:
Assuming that the value of permanent carbon emis-
sions reductions is constant over time, the value of this
ratio is affected by choices of years for length of
sequestration commitment period and discount rate
(table 2.4).10
In summary, alternative assumptions regarding the
permanence and C-stock equilibrium issues motivate
alternative payment structures for carbon sequestra-
tion. The asset price payment structure assumes the
carbon will be sequestered permanently and so values
a unit of carbon sequestration in year t equally with a
similar unit of carbon emissions reduction in year t.
With this structure, farmers receive payments based on
the additional carbon sequestered in each year. On the
other hand, the rental payment structure is based on
the assumption that, at some point in the future,
sequestered carbon may be released back into the
atmosphere—thereby reducing its GHG-mitigation
value relative to reductions in carbon emissions. The
rental approach makes payments for total additional
carbon based on that portion of the market value of
permanent sequestration that occurs during the
contract period. The rental approach will pay for the
value of all sequestered carbon that actually occurs
regardless of how long that carbon is stored in soils or
biomass. The asset-price payment approach, on the
other hand, could result in significant overpayments if
the assumption of permanence is incorrect.
Design of an Incentive Program
An overarching policy design issue is evaluating the
optimal path of GHG concentration level in the atmos-
phere over the next several centuries, balancing the
costs and benefits of achieving different paths of atmos-
pheric concentration levels of greenhouse gases through
time. The analysis required to address this issue is both
extraordinarily complex and subject to substantial
unknowns.
In this report, we focus on two more narrow aspects of
designing an incentive program. First, by evaluating
the economic potential for different agricultural activi-
ties to sequester carbon, we can highlight the activities
that will yield the greatest amount of sequestration at a
given carbon incentive level. Further, our analysis is
designed to contribute to an evaluation of the least-cost
mix of terrestrial carbon sequestration and GHG emis-
sions-reduction activities to achieve any desired level
of GHG mitigation.
10 If the carbon price is expected to decrease (increase) over time,
the ratio of the value of temporary sequestration to the value of
permanent emissions reduction will rise (fall). That is, temporary
sequestration today will be worth more (less) relative to permanent
emissions reduction. 






















Table 2.4—Ratio (λ λa) of value for temporary
sequestration to value for emissions reduction for
selected discount rates and sequestration periods
Carbon sequestration period (years)
Discount rate 1 5 10 15 20
.05 .050 .145 .254 .354 .443
.10 .100 .280 .469. 620 .738
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.10 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
Second, we evaluate the cost effectiveness of alterna-
tive designs for incentives to promote carbon seques-
tration in agriculture. In this section, we consider the
implications of three types of choices regarding the
coverage of incentives for the cost effectiveness of
achieving additional carbon net sequestration, relative
to the baseline level. The first is the scope of the
incentives, and of the associated accounting—in terms
of geographical regions, economic sectors, mitigating
activities, and GHGs covered. The second and third
address what measure of carbon sequestration (net
emissions reduction) the payments will cover. Will
they be limited to net sequestration (gross sequestra-
tion net of any land-based emissions), or will they
cover all gross sequestration? And will they be limited
to additional carbon sequestration (beyond the pre-
incentive program baseline), or will they compensate
early adopters of carbon-sequestering practices too?
Defining the Scope of the Incentives and 
the Scope of Accounting
In analyzing any set of incentives to encourage farmers
to adopt land uses and production practices that
sequester carbon in soils and biomass, it is important
to note two potential issues related to program scope.
First, designs that limit activities covered by incentives
may exclude more cost-effective options for achieving
a given level of mitigation. As a result, the estimated
costs of achieving a given level of carbon sequestra-
tion/GHG mitigation may be substantially higher than
what is really possible.11
Second, if the incentives being analyzed induce
actions that decrease carbon sequestration and/or
increase GHG emissions in noncovered GHGs, activ-
ities, sectors, or regions, the estimated net sequestra-
tion/GHG mitigation attributed to the incentives may
be overstated—perhaps significantly. The scope of
GHG accounting, however, need not be limited to
the scope of activities included in the incentives. 
If the scope of GHG accounting is broad enough to
encompass—at least most of—the induced effects,
the accounting will more accurately reflect the net
sequestration/ GHG mitigation attributable to the
incentives.
“Leakage” refers to decreasing carbon sequestration or
increases in GHG emissions that are induced by price
changes associated with market adjustments in
response to carbon incentives. The term leakage is
used because the increase in net emissions results from
activities, gases, or sectors that are not covered by the
program or entities in the covered sector that are not
participating in the program.12
In the context of farm-sector incentives to increase
the use of carbon-sequestering land uses and produc-
tion practices, leakage can occur both within and
outside the farm sector. For example, a program to
afforest large areas of marginal cropland and pasture
can cause leakage in the forest sector due to its
impact on forest harvest and land-use decisions.
Forestry is an alternative economic use for tens of
millions of acres now in crop or livestock
production.13 Large-scale conversions of agricultural
lands to forest could create expectations of higher
timber supplies and lower timber prices in the future.
A sufficient fall in the expected longrun returns to
forestry could induce landowners to shift timber
harvests (and associated carbon emissions) forward.
Further, the lower expected returns could also induce
forest owners to reduce forest management activities
and lower future replanting rates, thereby lowering
carbon sequestration rates per acre.14 The higher net
emissions (or leakage) in the forest sector would
partially offset the sequestration gains in the agricul-
tural sector covered by the incentives.
12 For completeness, we acknowledge that some activities induced
by, but not included in, such a set of incentives may also sequester
carbon or reduce GHG emissions. From an incentive design stand-
point, such outcomes would be desirable since more GHG mitiga-
tion would be achieved than paid for. The GHG mitigation litera-
ture, however, suggests that leakage would be much more common
than sequestration and/or GHG emissions reductions outside the
incentive coverage. Given this consensus and the negative implica-
tions that leakage has for policy design—namely, getting less
GHG mitigation than is paid for—we focus solely on leakage in
this analysis. 
13 Parks and Hardie (1995) and Moulton and Richards (1990) both
identify about 116 million acres of cropland and pasture in the con-
tiguous 48 States suitable for growing hardwood or softwood trees.
The Parks and Hardie estimate is derived from the 1987 National
Resources Inventory data and a map of tree species ranges. The
Moulton and Richards estimate reflects agricultural lands where ero-
sion exceeds the erosion tolerance rate. Moulton and Richards also
identify an additional 149.7 million acres of cropland and pasture
that are suitable for conversion to forest but are not suited to sus-
tained agricultural production (including wet soils). 
14 The degree to which forest sector responses to farm sector
afforestation programs might offset carbon sequestered in agriculture
is addressed in several studies reviewed in chapter 3 of this report.
11 To illustrate, Reilly et al. (1999) estimate the cost of reducing
U.S. GHG emissions by 650 MMTCE would be 60 percent lower
if all GHGs are included relative to a carbon-only strategy.Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 11
Leakage within agriculture can be illustrated by the
potential effect of farmers’ responses to incentives to
eliminate fallow periods from rotations. Farmers may
increase soil carbon by eliminating fallow; however,
if farmers keep the affected lands in production and
apply additional fertilizer, the GHG-mitigation benefits
of the carbon-sequestration activities would be at least
partially offset by higher N2O emissions. If GHG
accounting is limited to carbon, the estimated changes
in net GHG emissions may be misleading. The net
effects of an incentive may not be accurately assessed
unless accounting reflects all GHG emissions across
all markets and activities that are directly and indi-
rectly affected by the incentives.
What To Pay for—Gross Versus 
Net Sequestration? 
The payment basis for carbon incentives has important
implications for leakage. Conceptually, one option is to
have symmetric incentives—positive payments for
sequestration and negative payments for emissions from
land use and land management activities. The system
would provide payments for net sequestration across the
covered sectors/activities—that is, for carbon sequestra-
tion, net of carbon emissions from changing land use
and land management activities. A tradable permit
system could provide symmetric incentives for
sectors/activities and regions subject to emissions limits.
For activities with emissions limits, emissions and
sequestration would be tracked on a periodic basis. Yet,
energy production is generally the primary activity
considered for emissions limits in the economic litera-
ture on tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases;
the transactions costs of imposing limits on agriculture
are generally considered to be prohibitive. 
Consequently, the literature generally discusses agri-
cultural activities as a potential source of sequestra-
tion offsets against energy emissions in a tradable
permit system, where the energy emissions are
subject to an emissions limit (but the agricultural
activities are not). In an offset system, symmetric
incentives could be realized only for entities that
participate in the offset program, and only if the
offset program requires entitywide accounting for
sequestration and emissions. Analogously, a volun-
tary subsidy program for carbon sequestration could
provide symmetric incentives for entities that enroll
in the program only if the program requires entity-
wide accounting for sequestration and emissions,
rather than accounting only on enrolled acres.
In this context, adoption of carbon-emitting activities by
entities elsewhere in the sector or the economy, which
are not enrolled in the program, will not be subject to
negative incentives. Such responses might occur, for
example, when program-induced shifts of cropland to
forestry reduce the supply of crops; as a result, crop
prices will increase in order to ration the smaller supply.
Farmers may respond to rising product prices by
bringing currently idle land into production, which
would generate additional carbon emissions without a
negative incentive for such emissions. If the carbon
accounting in a GHG emissions offset or subsidy
program covered only the fields where sequestering
activities are adopted, the accounting would likely over-
state net sequestration and understate the marginal costs
of sequestration from the payment system.
An alternative system would base payments on gross
sequestration of carbon in soils or biomass as a direct
result of adopting a covered activity, without any
deduction for emissions from the participating entity.
To illustrate how payments for gross sequestration
could reduce the cost effectiveness of a given set of
carbon-sequestration incentives, we consider a farmer
with two 1,000-acre parcels—one managed with
conventional tillage and the other with no-till. Under a
gross-sequestration payment system, the farmer can
receive payments for any land shifted from conven-
tional tillage to no-till. The farmer could achieve eligi-
bility for program payments under two courses of
action that have very different implications for net
incremental carbon sequestration. First, the farmer
could expand the use of no-till to both parcels. In this
case, the farmer will be managing an additional 1,000
acres of land with no-till relative to the pre-program
baseline and will be generating additional net carbon
sequestration on those acres.
Second, the farmer could simply switch tillage prac-
tices on the two parcels so that the one initially
managed with conventional tillage is now managed
with no-till, and vice versa. In this case, the farmer
potentially could claim payments for half of the land
in any period, but the additional carbon stored on the
land shifted to no-till is largely offset by increased
carbon tillage. In other words, no additional net
carbon sequestration will occur in this case.
For voluntary programs, once a piece of land is enrolled
in the program, rules could be established to prevent
compensation for the repeated switching in the second
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Expanding the Scope of Sequestration Incentives
In general, increasing the scope of carbon-sequestra-
tion incentives will decrease both the marginal cost
per unit of carbon sequestered and the total program
cost of achieving a given level of sequestration. To
make this point more concrete, we consider a stylized
set of incentives to increase the quantity of carbon
sequestered in agricultural soils and biomass. We
focus on the greater efficiency of including multiple
sequestration activities, but the logic generalizes to
multiple geographic areas, economic sectors, and
greenhouse gases.
The figure below shows hypothetical marginal cost
(MC) curves for carbon sequestered by afforesting
(AF) agricultural land or by expanding the use of no-
till (NT). Also shown is the MC curve for carbon
sequestered using both activities (AF+NT). As we
have drawn the MC curve for no-till sequestration,
any positive price for sequestered carbon will result in
some additional use of no-till. In many areas of the
United States, no-till, reduced tillage, and conven-
tional tillage systems are practiced in close
proximity—often on the same farm. In these areas, the
expected returns to the different tillage systems are
relatively close and it is reasonable that relatively
small incentives would induce some expanded use of
no-till. 
Conversely, no afforestation occurs until the price of
sequestered carbon exceeds PAF, min. The conversion
of pasture or cropland to forest requires a minimum of
site preparation and tree establishment costs.
Afforestation payments would have to cover these
costs, as well as any income that might be lost by
taking the land out of commodity production, before
farmers would shift these lands into trees. Note also
that the MC curve for expanding no-till rises faster
than the MC curve for afforestation. As a result, the
least-cost mix of sequestration activities will vary
with the amount of carbon sequestration desired. 
Consider the case where the program goal is to
sequester Q1 metric tons (mt) of carbon in the farm
sector. As drawn, sequestering Q1 metric tons of
carbon can be accomplished by paying farmers only
to adopt no-till, only to afforest agricultural land, or to
undertake a combination of the two activities. If the
program only pays for expanding no-till, the MC of
sequestering Q1 mt carbon will be Pc per mt and total
payments will equal Areas (A+B+C). If the program
only pays for afforestation, the MC of sequestering Q1
mt carbon will be Pb and total payments will equal
Areas (A+B). Hence, if only one activity is to be
targeted, the more cost-effective option for seques-
tering Q1 mt of carbon is to pay farmers to shift land
into trees. Opening the program to both activities,
however, lets low-cost suppliers of carbon from each
activity respond to the incentives. As a result, Q1 mt
of carbon can be sequestered at a MC of Pa - with 
q1, AF mt sequestered by afforestation and (Q1-q1, AF
= q1, NT ) mt sequestered by expanding no-till. Total
payments in this case are equal to Area (A).
Note, however, that a multiple-activity program does
not necessarily mean that all targeted activities will
occur. For example, if the carbon payment were less
than PAF min, afforestation will not be competitive and
the only sequestration activity observed will be some
additional use of no-till.
Illustrative marginal cost curves for sequestering
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no-till to conventional tillage may be economically
rational for other reasons. Consider, for example, the
case where, in the baseline, no-till systems produce
lower yields per acre than conventional tillage but the
no-till cost advantage compensates for the revenue
differential. As crop prices rise due to the offset program,
for example due to converting cropland to forestry, the
lost revenues from maintaining no-till will increase and
at some point no-till may no longer be advantageous.
Further, declining supplies and associated price increases
would provide incentives for entry of idle land into crop
production, resulting in additional carbon emissions. 
Establishing accounting for net sequestration across
the whole entity enrolled in a voluntary program,
rather than simply for the enrolled acres, will tend to
capture some of the price-induced increases in emis-
sions. However, some farms will find no advantage to
joining the program because their most profitable
response will be to increase net emissions. (The struc-
ture of the incentive will influence the size of this
group of farms.) Consequently, accounting for sectoral
gains in net carbon sequestration based on entities
participating in the offset program—rather than on all
entities in the sectors eligible for offset—will tend to
overstate the sequestration gains and understate the
true costs incurred per ton of net carbon sequestered in
the offset sectors. 
Eligibility for Sequestration Payments—
New Adopters Versus All Adopters (Including
“Good Actors”)
In terms of eligibility requirements, two payment
options relating to the additionality of carbon seques-
tration dominate both policy discussions and published
studies. The first option pays all farmers who practice
the activities covered by the incentives regardless of
how long they have been practicing the activities.
Hence, if a payment were offered to encourage farmers
to expand the use of—say, conservation tillage—all
farmers managing with conservation tillage would be
eligible for the payment. This option is referred to as
the “good actor” approach because it is perceived as
not penalizing farmers who undertook the desired
activity before the compensation policy was available.
The alternative “new adopters” option limits sequestra-
tion payments to farmers not engaged in the desired
land uses and production practices at the time of the
program baseline. As a result, payments only cover
additional carbon sequestration relative to the pre-
program baseline.
Supporters of the good-actor payment criterion argue
that it avoids “moral hazard,” in which farmers already
engaged in desired practices revert to undesirable land
uses and production practices to qualify for incentives.
This rationale requires the assumption that it is not
possible to avoid this situation by observing and penal-
izing such behavior.15 Those in favor of the new-adopter
criterion argue that it does not pay farmers for having
made changes in land uses or production practices that
they previously concluded were economically rational;
instead, it limits payments to farmers who require an
additional incentive to economically rationalize the
adoption of the desired uses and practices. 
From an incentive design perspective, the new-
adopters criterion will generally be less costly—
perhaps significantly so—than the good-actor
criterion, particularly if the moral hazard issue can be
resolved. For example, the United States has approxi-
mately 450 million acres of privately owned cropland
and 352 million acres of privately owned grassland
(i.e., pasture or range) (Vesterby and Krupa, 2001). In
a program providing incentives to shift economically
marginal cropland to permanent grasses under the
new-adopter criterion, owners of any of the 450
million acres of cropland that shift into grasses would
be eligible for the incentive payments. Under the
good-actor criterion, not only would owners of these
acres be eligible to receive payments but so, too,
would owners of at least some of the 352 million acres
of privately owned pasture and range that remained in
those uses. The same issue could arise with providing
farmers incentives to afforest cropland and pasture, or
incentives to shift from conventional to conservation
tillage. At present, about 420 million acres of privately
owned forest land and over 100 million acres of crop-
land in the United States are managed with some form
of conservation tillage (Vesterby and Krupa, 2001;
USDA, ERS, 1998). 
Conceptual Framework for the 
ERS Analysis 
Due to limitations in the data available for our
analysis, we were forced to limit the scope of our
15 “Moral hazard” refers to situations where an incentive or policy
actually encourages behavior detrimental to the objectives of the
incentive or policy. The classic example is insurance, which once
obtained, reduces people’s incentive to act in ways that decrease the
probability of incurring a loss—and in the extreme, may encourage
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analysis along several dimensions. The scope of our
analysis covers the major carbon-sequestering activi-
ties in the agricultural sector. Among the three major
agricultural GHGs, we limit our analysis to carbon.
Our analysis simulates payments offered to producers
to adopt specific carbon-sequestering land uses and
production practices: shifting cropland or grazing
land (i.e., pasture or range) to forest, shifting crop-
land to perennial grasses, switching from conven-
tional to conservation tillage (particularly no-till),
shifting to carbon-sequestering crop rotations,
expanding the use of winter cover crops, and elimi-
nating periods of summer fallow. The cropland and
grazing land activities included in our analysis repre-
sent about 80 percent of the technical carbon-seques-
tration potential for all management activities listed
in table 2.2. The primary reason for omitting activi-
ties from our analysis is a lack of data on the farm-
level costs of adoption. Without data on adoption
costs, we cannot assess the net returns associated
with undertaking a given activity relative to alterna-
tive production possibilities and, therefore, cannot
assess the likelihood of adoption of certain activities.
Our GHG accounting is also limited to carbon in the
agricultural sector. Consequently, our analysis does not
track leakage related to GHG emissions in response to
the program in other economic sectors (notably
forestry) or to other GHG gases (notably methane and
nitrous oxide) in agriculture. We account for farm-
sector carbon leakage by comparing performance of
incentives based on net sequestration, relative to those
based on gross sequestration. 
Decisionmaking in the model regarding production
activities (input mix, output choice, production tech-
nology, and crop rotation) is done at the region level,
not at the individual farm level. Consequently, net
sequestration payments are made on a sectorwide
basis, not on the basis of voluntary farm participants;
as a result, there is full symmetry in the treatment of
land-based carbon emitted or sequestered as a result of
the program. We examine the impact of different treat-
ments of the permanence issue by designing a rental
carbon payment system to complement a carbon asset-
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Recent studies have estimated the potential farm-
sector impacts of strategies to increase the quantity of
carbon sequestered in agricultural soils and biomass.
Findings in these studies suggest farm-sector seques-
tration activities that might be economically feasible
at different prices. A review of the accounting and
modeling procedures employed in the studies reveals
how researchers have addressed permanence, C-stock
equilibrium, and leakage, and, where possible, high-
lights the economic implications of alternative treat-
ments (app. 1). 
The general approach in past studies has been to
construct a hypothetical situation in which farmers
are paid to change land uses and/or production prac-
tices to store additional carbon in soils and biomass.
Most of the analyses focus on a single carbon-
sequestering activity. Parks and Hardie (1995), Alig
et al. (1997), Stavins (1999), and Plantinga et al.
(1999) assess the sequestration potential of
afforesting marginal agricultural lands. Antle et al.
(2001) look separately at shifting cropland to grasses
and reducing summer fallow. Pautsch et al. (2001)
focus on expanding the use of no-till systems.
McCarl and Schneider (2001) and McCarl et al.
(2003) present more comprehensive assessments in
which carbon sequestration is part of agriculture’s
larger potential to mitigate GHG emissions. In these
studies, farmers can adjust land uses, crop choices,
and management practices in ways that increase
carbon sequestration, decrease GHG emissions (i.e.,
CO2,C H 4, and N2O), or increase production of
biofuel crops. 
Discussion of Past Studies
In a 1995 study, Parks and Hardie simulate a strategy
to afforest marginal agricultural lands patterned on
USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The
strategy assumes farmers enroll lands in year 1 for a
period of 10 years, receive a 50-percent cost-share
payment to plant trees, and receive an annual payment
to offset lost agricultural revenue. Region-specific
carbon-sequestration values for lands converted to
forests are developed by disaggregating 116.1 million
acres of private nonprime farmland deemed suitable
for forest into 433 regions, which are then linked to a
map of forest types. Sequestration is defined narrowly
to include only carbon stored in trees. Agricultural
and forest rents reflect the discounted returns to lands
in each use in each region. Thus, the decision to move
land from agriculture to forest is based on a compar-
ison of the longrun returns in each use. 
The study is limited in its treatments of permanence,
C-stock equilibrium, and leakage. It is assumed that
10 years after agricultural lands are planted to trees,
timber production becomes the profit-maximizing
land use. At that point, farmers will maintain the
forests without additional Government payments. By
assumption, the study sidesteps the permanence
issue. Additionally, because the carbon accounting
terminates at 10 years—which is shorter than the
optimal rotation period in most regions—the study
fails to address the issue of permanence raised by
potential harvests. The 10-year timeframe of the
analysis also sidesteps the C-stock equilibrium
issue—since it takes decades for a newly planted
forest to reach a carbon equilibrium state. Finally,
because the model does not include any carbon-emit-
ting activities that might occur in the farm or forest
sectors in response to the afforestation incentives, the
analysis does not consider the potential for agricul-
tural- or forest-sector carbon leakage. 
Parks and Hardy present results for four scenarios
assuming an afforestation program funded at $456.2
million annually. The first two scenarios target both
cropland and pasture under the enrollment criteria of
minimizing the cost per ton of carbon sequestered
and minimizing the cost per acre enrolled (based on a
fixed per acre payment). The last two scenarios
consider the same enrollment criteria but limit enroll-
ment eligibility to cropland. The most cost-effective
strategy bases payments directly on carbon
sequestered and has the broadest land eligibility crite-
rion. For the two scenarios that target both cropland
and pasture, afforestation is 0.9 million acres less and
carbon sequestration is 3.3 MMT more under the
criterion of minimizing costs per ton sequestered than
under the criterion of minimizing costs per acre (app.
1). More generally, for the strategy that targets
carbon directly, the supply curve for sequestered
carbon rises gradually from a level of 18.1 MMT and
a marginal cost of $85 per mt to a sequestration level
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of 90.7 MMT and a marginal cost of $465 per MT.1
For levels of sequestration above 90.7 MMT, the
supply curve turns up sharply, suggesting an upper
limit to the amount of carbon that can be economi-
cally removed from the atmosphere by afforesting
agricultural lands.2 When afforestation incentives are
limited to cropland, enrollment and sequestration
levels drop by over 55 percent, indicating that most
afforestation would occur on lands now in pasture.
Alig et al. also analyze CRP-type incentives that
would pay farmers to shift marginal agricultural lands
to forest. Their framework—the Forest and Agricul-
tural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM)—is an
intertemporal market and spatial equilibrium model in
which agriculture and forestry compete for the use of
land. FASOM’s forestry sector consists of nine
geographic regions and various categories reflecting
differences in product class, land ownership, forest
type, site productivity, and management intensity. The
model’s agricultural component is a version of McCarl
and Schneider’s Agricultural Sector Model (ASM).
Model simulations run for 90 years, but policy impacts
are only reported for 50 years. Producers maximize the
return to land by shifting land between agriculture and
forestry and by changing forest management intensity
(endogenous forest management decisions include
harvest age, management intensity, and forest type).
FASOM runs on a decadal time step, allowing land to
shift between agriculture and forestry every 10 years as
the relative returns to these uses change over time. It
addresses the permanence and leakage issues in that
decisions on afforestation, deforestation, and forest
management are endogenous to the model and the asso-
ciated activities are tracked over time. Hence, the model
accounts for changes in the net levels of carbon seques-
tration that occur over the years in each simulation.
Conceptually, the C-stock equilibrium issue is reflected
in the model’s timber growth functions, although in the
simulations, forests are typically harvested before this
equilibrium is reached. In this study, sequestration
incentives are based on gross rather than net sequestra-
tion—meaning landowners are rewarded for adopting
practices that sequester carbon but are not penalized for
adopting practices that emit carbon.
Among the model’s simulations, the scenario with a
fixed carbon flux target of 1.6 gigatons per decade has a
relatively large economic impact. Over the 90-year
simulation, the present value of losses for U.S. forest
and agricultural consumers are $7.5 billion and $76.4
billion, respectively, while the present value of gains for
U.S. forest and agricultural producers are $6.6 billion
and $39.6 billion, respectively. During the first 50 years
of the simulation, many owners of private forestland
shift to earlier timber harvests, and some of this land
moves into agricultural production. Overall, 59 million
acres shift between the two sectors—with a net increase
in forest area of 19 million acres. Alig et al. conclude
that afforesting agricultural lands could be an effective
component of a national GHG-mitigation strategy, but
that the net carbon sequestration achieved will be much
overstated if the program does not account for emis-
sions from related forest-sector responses. 
Plantinga et al. and Stavins also focus solely on the
afforestation of agricultural lands. These studies develop
econometric land-use models based on behavioral data.
The methodologies lack an explicit link between
afforestation of agricultural lands and related responses
in forest product markets but do capture the impacts of
various difficult-to-measure factors (e.g., becoming
familiar with forestry) that make decisions to shift agri-
cultural land into forest more “sticky” than if based
strictly on maximizing expected profits. As in Alig et
al., land moves between agriculture and forestry over
time, and so these studies track changes in net carbon
sequestration as land shifts between the two sectors—
that is, they account for permanence and leakage.
Stavins bases incentives on the net carbon sequestration
from land-use decisions, while Plantinga et al. base
incentives on gross sequestration. Again, C-stock equi-
librium could be addressed in the model’s timber
growth functions, but forests are generally harvested
before equilibrium is reached. 
Plantinga et al. estimate separate models for Maine,
Wisconsin, and South Carolina using data from
various years between 1971 and 1996. The dependent
variables are the share of county land in agriculture
relative to the share in forest, and the share of county
land in other uses relative to the share in forest. Inde-
pendent variables include agricultural rents per acre
(stated as the present discounted value of all net
1 The figures $85 and $465 are obtained by setting T=20 tons (i.e.,
18.1 mt) and T=100 (i.e. 90.7 mt), respectively, in the MC equation
in Parks and Hardie (p. 130) and dividing the results by 0.8051 (to
convert to 1997 dollars). 
2 We do not mean to imply here that any particular level of
sequestration is economical. Only that the shape of the MC curve
implies an upper limit to quantity of carbon that would be 
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returns from agricultural uses over the simulation
period), forest rents per acre (stated as the present
discounted value of timber revenues), population, and
land quality. Afforestation incentives are again
patterned on the CRP and offer landowners annual
payments to convert agricultural lands to trees for a
period of 10 years starting at the beginning of each
decade. Simulations start in 2000 and run for 60 years.
Although not included in the simulation, program
costs are adjusted to reflect a one-time tree establish-
ment payment. 
Results are presented for four scenarios reflecting
different assumptions about population growth, timber
harvest, and payment structure. Across scenarios and
regions, results indicate that the marginal cost of
carbon sequestration increases almost linearly with the
level of sequestration. Marginal costs are generally
lowest when population is held constant, sequestration
payments are uniform across States, and harvesting is
not allowed on enrolled lands. For this scenario and a
payment of $45.09 per mt carbon, the States would
have total sequestration of 1.36 MMT (Maine), 12.89
MMT (South Carolina), and 27.22 MMT (Wisconsin)
(with future sequestration discounted at 5 percent).3 At
the same payment level but allowing for timber
harvests, the discounted sequestration levels decrease
to 1.04 MMT (Maine), 11.53 MMT (South Carolina),
and 22.69 MMT (Wisconsin). 
Stavins models the shares of county land in forest and
in agriculture as functions of agricultural rents, farm
production costs, existing forest area, conversion costs,
and net returns to forestry. The model is estimated
with panel data for 36 parishes/counties in Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Mississippi covering the period 1935-
1984. Model simulations run for 90 years, and the
sequestration incentives include a payment for
afforestation and a charge for deforestation. 
For the three Delta States, Stavins finds that the
marginal cost of sequestering carbon rises gradually to a
sequestration level of about 6.35 MMT per year. At this
level, the marginal cost of sequestration is about $79.86
per mt, net afforestation is 4.6 million acres, and the
carbon payment/charge is about $109.81 per acre.
Marginal costs rise steeply for sequestration levels
above 6.35 MMT annually, becoming nearly asymptotic
at about 14.52 MMT per year. Stavins concludes that
sequestration would be competitive with abatement at
lower levels of net emissions reduction. 
Shifting from afforestation, Antle et al. and Pautsch et
al. assess the economic feasibility of paying farmers to
sequester carbon in agricultural soils by eliminating
fallow periods from crop rotations, expanding grass-
lands, and increasing the use of no-till systems. The
methodologies differ from the afforestation studies in
two key respects. First, the geographic scopes are
smaller—Pautsch et al. is limited to Iowa and Antle et
al. focus on a subregion of Montana. Second, the crop
production models used in these works are estimated
with field-level data, which precludes these frame-
works from comparing sequestration opportunities
across regions. Still, the use of field-level data allows
site-specific factors—or spatial heterogeneity—to be
considered in the design and evaluation of incentives
to encourage farmers to adopt the desired land uses
and production practices.
Neither Antle et al. nor Pautsch et al. explicitly
addresses C-stock equilibrium, leakage, or perma-
nence. The studies omit the C-stock equilibrium issue
because the timeframes of the scenarios are less than
the period needed for most of the affected lands to
reach new carbon equilibrium levels. Leakage is
omitted because all land-management changes reflect
changes to carbon-sequestering uses or practices.
Regarding permanence, both studies implicitly assume
that farmers continue the new land uses or production
practices when the payments end. 
Antle et al. assess the potential costs of paying farmers
in Montana’s dryland grain region to sequester carbon
by switching from crop-fallow to continuous cropping
rotations and by shifting cropland into permanent
grass. The study analyzes each activity separately. In
the scenarios, farmers commit to maintaining the new
land use or production practice for a period of 20
years. Antle et al. develop econometric production
models for wheat, barley, and permanent grass in both
continuous crop and crop-fallow rotations using 1995
data for 425 farms and 1,200 fields. These models are
then incorporated into a producer-decision framework
that allocates land among the different rotations in
response to payments to switch additional land to
continuous cropping or permanent grasses. The study
estimates changes in soil carbon by running the land-
3 These dollar and sequestration values were obtained from the
graphs in Plantinga et al. (pp. 820-21). We convert the results—
presented in 1995 dollars and short tons—to 1997 dollars and 
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use changes obtained in the model simulations through
the Century crop-ecosystem model. 
Three findings in Antle et al. are especially noteworthy.
First, eliminating fallow periods appears to be a cost-
effective method of carbon sequestration while
expanding grasslands does not—at least in eastern
Montana. Over a 20-year simulation, sequestering about
7 MMT of carbon by expanding grasslands requires an
annual rental payment of $51.77 per acre and costs the
Government $3.15 billion (not discounted). By contrast,
sequestering the same amount of carbon by increasing
continuous cropping requires an annual payment of
$4.14 per acre and costs the Government $206.34
million (again, not discounted).
Second, a comprehensive GHG-mitigation strategy can
include activities that sequester relatively small amounts
of carbon but at a very low cost. At the highest payment
level, switching from crop-fallow rotations to contin-
uous cropping sequesters less than 19 MMT of carbon
over the 20-year simulation. While this amount repre-
sents only a fraction of the sequestration potential of
afforestation, two-thirds, or about 12 MMT, could be
captured for an annual payment of $8 per acre. 
Finally, for a given activity, the cost of sequestering
carbon can vary significantly within a region due to
site-specific biophysical and economic characteristics.
Across locations in the study area, the marginal cost of
sequestering carbon ranges from $51.15 to $511.51 per
mt in the permanent grassland simulation and from
$12.28 to $143.22 per mt in the continuous cropping
simulation. While it is difficult to account for differ-
ences among fields and farms in national agricultural
sector models, policymakers should note the potential
for cost savings if sequestration incentives are
designed with flexibility to take advantage of hetero-
geneity among locations in each region. 
Pautsch et al. examine the cost of paying farmers in
Iowa to expand use of no-till systems under alternative
payment and program eligibility structures. Payment
schemes include a uniform per acre payment and a
variable per acre payment based on the amount of
carbon sequestered. Program eligibility options include
paying all users of no-till systems and limiting
payments to new adopters. 
Using field-level soil and weather data, county-level
crop yield data, and State-level price and cost data,
Pautsch et al. develop an econometric model in which
the probability of adopting no-till is a function of net
returns to conventional tillage, local soil characteris-
tics, and regional temperature and precipitation vari-
ables. Production possibilities include 14 rotations
consisting of mixes of corn, soybeans, wheat,
sorghum, and hay. As in Antle et al., the changes in
area under no-till are fed into a biophysical model to
estimate changes in soil carbon. 
Two findings in Pautsch et al. highlight the importance
of payment structure and eligibility criteria in deter-
mining the costs associated with incentives to increase
the quantity of carbon stored in agricultural soils. First,
the average cost per metric ton of carbon sequestered is
lower when per acre payments to adopt no-till are based
on carbon sequestered rather than set at a fixed level.
Parks and Hardie also support this finding, but to a
lesser degree; in Pautsch et al., the average cost per unit
sequestered is about four times lower under the price-
discriminating structure than under the fixed payment
structure. Second, cost savings are considerable when
eligibility is limited to new adopters. In this analysis,
paying all farmers who typically use no-till doubles the
average cost per unit of carbon sequestered relative to
paying only new adopters. 
McCarl and Schneider expand the focus beyond a single
carbon-sequestering activity, developing a comprehen-
sive GHG-mitigation strategy that pays farmers to
change land uses, crop mixes, crop-management prac-
tices, and livestock-management practices in ways that
increase carbon sequestration, decrease GHG emissions
(i.e., CO2,C H 4, or N20), or increase biofuel crop
production. Their ASMGHG model—a market and
spatial equilibrium mathematical programming frame-
work—depicts production and consumption in 63 U.S.
regions for 22 traditional crop commodities, 3 biofuel
crops, 29 livestock commodities, and more than 60
processed agricultural products. In responding to rela-
tive changes in input prices, farmers can adjust tillage,
fertilization, irrigation, manure treatment, and feed
mixes. The study uses the biophysical Environmental
Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model to calculate
changes in carbon sequestration associated with changes
in crop management activities. Thirty-year simulations
of FASOM (see Alig et al., 1999) provide data on land
shifting from agriculture to forestry and the associated
quantities of carbon sequestered. Changes in emissions
associated with livestock management are based on
EPA data. 
McCarl and Schneider simulate ASMGHG with
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$48.10, $96.20, and $480.80 per MT.4 These values
are treated as a subsidy when farmers switch to activi-
ties that reduce GHG emissions and a charge when
farmers change to activities that increase emissions.
By design, the framework pays farmers only for the
net GHG mitigation that results from their response 
to the full set of incentives. Additionally, the link
between the agricultural and forestry sectors allows
ASMGHG to reflect the forest sector’s response to the
afforestation of agricultural lands—at least in the long
run. Hence, the framework explicitly accounts for
carbon leakage through forest-sector activities. While
McCarl and Schneider do not explicitly address the
permanence and C-stock equilibrium issues, they
adapt the framework to address these issues in McCarl
et al. (2003). 
For carbon valued at $9.60, $48.10, $96.20, and
$480.80 per MT, net carbon sequestration is, 51.80,
146.40, 238.50, and 395.50 MMT, respectively, while
net GHG mitigation is equivalent to 53.90, 154.10,
255.70, and 425.90 MMT of carbon, respectively.
McCarl and Schneider conclude that paying farmers to
sequester carbon, reduce GHG emissions, and increase
biofuel crop production would positively affect farmers
and negatively affect U.S. consumers. For carbon valued
at $9.60, $48.10, $96.20, and $480.80 per MT, farm
welfare increases $ 0.40, $4.30, $13.40, and $76.90
billion, respectively, while U.S. consumer welfare
decreases $0.40, $5.20, $18.50, and $104.60 billion,
respectively. More generally, at low carbon prices soil
carbon sequestration, afforestation, and CH4 / N2O
emissions reduction dominate GHG-mitigation activi-
ties. At high carbon prices, the dominant mitigation
activities are afforestation and biofuel production.
Regardless of the value assigned to carbon, CH4 and
N2O emissions reduction activities make a relatively
small contribution to GHG mitigation.
More recently, Jones et al. (2002) and McCarl et al.
(2003) identified approaches for treating permanence
and C-stock equilibrium in static models that do not
implicitly assume sequestration is permanent.5 As
described in chapter 2 of this report, this approach
employs a series of annual payments based on a pay-
as-you-store principle. In essence, a discount—based
on the length of the contract period for carbon seques-
tration and the choice of discount rate—is applied to
the value of a unit of emissions reduction to determine
the value of a unit of carbon sequestration during the
contract period. Our analysis also employs this
approach to valuing sequestered carbon. 
Conclusions
Differences in scope (including geographic region,
sector, activity, and GHG coverage), methodology, and
underlying assumptions make it difficult to directly
compare the results of previous studies of the economic
potential to sequester carbon in agriculture. Recognizing
these limitations, however, the literature does provide
some insights regarding carbon-sequestering land uses
and production practices that may be competitive at
different carbon prices and the levels of carbon that
might be sequestered at those prices. Additionally, the
studies reveal how researchers have addressed perma-
nence, C-stock equilibrium, and leakage. 
Taken collectively, the studies reviewed here suggest
that the farm sector’s economic potential to sequester
additional carbon is significantly less than amounts
deemed technically possible in soil science-based
assessments. For example, for the United States as a
whole, the studies cited in table 2.2 estimate the tech-
nical potential for sequestering carbon at 35-107 MMT
per year for expanding conservation tillage and 6-18
MMT per year for eliminating summer fallow and
changing rotations. In contrast, for expanding no-till in
Iowa, Pautsch et al. estimate the cost of sequestering 1
MMT of carbon at about $200 per MT. On the
national scale, McCarl and Schneider estimate the
maximum economic potential of about 70 MMT per
year for all farm-sector soil management activities at a
carbon price of $500 per MT. 
The most noteworthy divergence between soil science
and economic assessments concerns conversions of
cropland to permanent grasses. From a national
perspective, Eve et al. (2000) estimate the technical
potential of converting cropland to grassland at
between 26 and 54 MMT of carbon per year. In
contrast, economic assessments by Antle et al. and
McCarl and Schneider find that sequestering carbon
via this land use change would not be competitive with
other carbon-sequestering activities. 
4 Money values in McCarl and Schneider are in 2000 dollars. We
have converted their values to 1997 dollars. To obtain the values
reported in McCarl and Schneider, multiply the values reported
here by 1.04. 
5 The Jones et al. citation refers to a presentation at the Forestry and
Agriculture Greenhouse Gas Modeling Forum in Shepherdstown,
WV (October 9-11, 2002). This presentation and the paper by
McCarl et al. are not included in appendix 1 because of similarities
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The published studies indicate that the most cost-effec-
tive mix of carbon-sequestering activities will depend
on the level of carbon payment offered—or equiva-
lently, the target quantity of total sequestration to be
achieved by the program. Across studies, changes in
production practices—such as expanding no-till and
shifting to carbon sequestering rotations—dominate
farm sector responses at very low payment levels.
Afforestation becomes the dominant sequestration
activity at a carbon payment between $20 and $100
per MT, depending on the specific features of the
context modeled. McCarl and Schneider, the one study
that considers multiple GHGs, finds that CH4 and N2O
emissions reduction activities become feasible as
carbon payments approach $50 per MT. Above
payments of $100 per mt, additional emissions reduc-
tions from these activities become very limited at any
price. McCarl and Schneider also find that production
of biofuel crops starts to become economically attrac-
tive at a payment of about $50 per mt and joins
afforestation as a dominant GHG-mitigation activity at
payments above $75 per mt. 
The treatment of permanence, C-stock equilibrium,
and leakage in previous studies is noteworthy for
several reasons. First, the finite time period for annual
increments to the carbon stock in agricultural soils is
generally sidestepped, without comment. In the
predominant static frameworks, the sequestration
programs generally end before affected soils or forests
reach their new carbon equilibrium levels. The longrun
dynamic models employed for forestry explicitly
address the issue because they typically incorporate a
carbon-stock accumulation function by age of timber. 
Treatment of permanence varies in previous studies.
Studies that employ dynamic frameworks generally
track changes in net carbon storage over time;
however, some of the forestry modeling has not
employed negative charges for emissions from terres-
trial storage. In dynamic models, permanence can be
incorporated in sequestration incentives by paying
landowners when they switch to land uses or produc-
tion practices that sequester carbon and charging them
when they switch to uses and practices that emit
carbon. In static models, permanence can be accounted
for by using the rental price for a specified commit-
ment period, derived from the full asset value
employed for permanent sequestration. In our analysis,
which employs a static model, we follow this approach
to account for the temporary nature of carbon seques-
tration in the design of sequestration incentives. 
The literature also varies in the treatment of leakage.
By design, models that are limited to a single land use
or production practice cannot account for leakage
related to changes in other land uses or production
practices. Similarly, single-sector models cannot
account for leakage related to changes in land uses or
production practices in other economic sectors. Past
farm sector studies (Parks and Hardie, Antle et al., and
Pautsch et al.) have generally focused on a single
carbon-sequestration activity, and the carbon
accounting has not included activities outside of the
incentive program to check for leakage. With such
limited coverage of activities, the potential for leakage
from other activities in agriculture or forestry is great.
In contrast, the forestry literature, which uses dynamic
longrun models in which agriculture and forestry are
linked via competition for land (Alig et al., Stavins,
and Plantinga et al.), has examine the issue. These
studies generally find that forest sector responses to
farm sector carbon sequestration incentives can be an
important source of leakage—particularly at higher
carbon payment levels. 
Our framework is limited to the agricultural sector, but
it does account for the net effect on sequestered carbon
after farmers have adjusted for land-use changes
among crop, grass, or forest land and for a variety of
crop land-management practices. It does not, however,
capture forest-sector leakage, so we acknowledge the
potential for upward bias in our sequestration results
relative to a full accounting of the agriculture and
forestry sectors. With respect to past studies, we note
that the magnitude of forest-sector leakage is critically
linked to assumptions previous researchers have
employed regarding the longrun (50-100 years) time
paths of income growth, population growth, technolog-
ical change, price expectations, and consumer prefer-
ences. Different assumptions about the longrun time
paths of these variables can have very different impli-
cations for the longrun demand for land in the two
sectors and thus very different implications concerning
potential leakage. 
Finally, researchers to date have formulated hypothet-
ical incentives—often based on those in USDA’s
CRP—which are then incorporated into economic
models and simulated for various exogenously speci-
fied carbon payments. The result is to trace out
scenario-specific supply curves for sequestered carbon.
Our analysis will also trace out a farm-sector supply
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The empirical framework for this study, the U.S. Agri-
cultural Sector Model (USMP), is a spatial and market
equilibrium model built to assess a wide range of
economic, environmental, and policy issues of interest to
U.S. agriculture. USMP simulates farm-sector impacts
resulting from changes in commodity market conditions,
agricultural technologies, and Government policies
related to commodity production, resource use, environ-
mental quality, and trade. Because adjustment paths are
not modeled, USMP simulation results are properly
interpreted as a comparison between an initial baseline
and a new medium-run equilibrium state.1
USMP can be used to carry out analysis relative to any
base year between 1988 and 2010 inclusive. Simula-
tions begin by calibrating the model’s acreage, tillage
practice shares, domestic production, domestic
consumption, imports and exports, input and output
prices, and corresponding spatial information to the
desired historical year or to approximate conditions in a
USDA baseline year.2 In response to changes in farm
policy or market conditions, the model endogenously
determines new equilibrium levels of its variables after
all output and input markets have fully adjusted. Agri-
culture’s response to price changes involves all
producers adjusting their input use, output choices, and
production levels such that the marginal value of
product produced per unit of input equals the marginal
input cost for all inputs and the net returns to the last
units of production are equal across all commodities. 
Reported farm-sector impacts include changes in
regional commodity production, national commodity
prices, national commodity consumption, use of produc-
tion inputs, farm income, agricultural producer and
consumer surplus, participation in Government
commodity programs, Government program expendi-
tures, and environmental indicators.3 The model is
linked with regularly updated USDA production prac-
tices surveys (USDA, ERS, 1992; and USDA, NASS,
1996), the USDA multiyear baseline, and geographic
information system databases, such as the National
Resources Inventory (NRI) (USDA, NRCS, 1994).
USMP depicts the U.S. farm sector in considerable
geographic, commodity market, and production-enter-
prise detail (fig. 4.1, table 4.1). The model disaggre-
gates the 48 contiguous States into 45 regions defined
by the intersection of the 10 USDA farm-production
regions and 26 land-resource regions. Crops include
corn, sorghum, oats, barley, wheat, rice, cotton,
soybeans, hay, and silage. Collectively, these 10 crops
account for about 75 percent of the value of U.S. agri-
cultural production (USDA, OCE, 1999).4 USMP also
includes 16 primary livestock commodities (the most
important being dairy, swine, beef cattle, and poultry)
and over two dozen processed and retail products
(including dairy, pork, fed beef, nonfed beef, poultry,
soy meal, soy oil, and livestock feed). With respect to
enterprise management, USMP has nearly 1,000
production activities reflecting alternative choices of
input mixes, output choices, production technologies
(e.g., choice of tillage system), and crop rotations. The
model also includes 70 production activities that
process primary farm commodities into intermediate
and final demand products. 
USMP’s objective function is to maximize the sum of
consumer and producer surplus across all commodity
markets. The input markets for cropland, pasture land,
family labor, hired labor, and irrigation water are
modeled at the regional level with upward-sloping
supply curves—that is, input supplies increase
(decrease) when their prices increase (decrease).
Twenty-three other farm-input markets—including
fuels, fertilizers, pesticide, seed, machinery, and
custom operations—are modeled at the national level.
In national input markets, supply functions are
perfectly elastic—implying input supplies can change
without affecting input prices.5
Chapter 4: Empirical Framework
1 The elasticities that determine supply and input use changes in
USMP are medium-run elasticities.
2 The USDA Long-Term Agricultural Baseline provides annual
projections for various market variables related to U.S. agriculture
through the 2010. Detailed information about the baseline can be
obtained at USDA, OCE (2001), and at http://usda.mannlib.cor-
nell.edu/data-sets/baseline
3 USMP is modeled in the General Algebraic Modeling System
(GAMS) as a nonlinear programming problem with solutions
obtained using the MINOS nonlinear optimizer solver. The model
consists of some 2,000 equations and 5,400 variables.
4 Due to limited production data, fruits, vegetables, and sugar are
not included in USMP. These crops are the only major commodity
groups not included in the model. 
5 Conceptually it would be straightforward to model these input mar-
kets with upward-sloping supply curves, but there is generally limited
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USMP production units reflect representative farm
enterprises for the relevant geographic areas (e.g., a
State or region). Hence, production activities in each
USMP region are composites of the different produc-
tion techniques that are actually practiced in the partic-
ular geographic area. Production activities are
generally represented by fixed-coefficient production
functions. In the case of crop enterprises, fertilizer
inputs per acre (and their corresponding yields) are
variable coefficients. For livestock operations, the
mixes of feed input and the feed rations vary with
changes in feed grain and livestock prices (subject to
various physical requirements of the different live-
stock). For crop commodities, production activities are
differentiated by tillage practice, multiyear crop rota-
tion, dryland or irrigated system, participation in
Government farm programs, and other characteristics. 
Final product markets are modeled at the national
level. On the demand side, USMP distinguishes
between the demands for domestic consumption,
export, commercial stocks, and Government stocks.
Government farm programs in USMP include produc-
tion flexibility contract payments, target prices,
acreage reduction, acreage flexibility, acreage diver-
sion, conservation reserve, and Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) loan programs.6 Participation in
USMP model regions
Figure 4.1
A - NW Forest, Forage, and Spec. Crops  K - N. Lake States Forest and Range
B - NW Wheat and Range  L - Lake States Fruit, Truck, and Dairy
C - Cal. Subtrop. Fruit, Truck, and Spec. Crops  M - Central Feed Grains and Livestock
D - Western Range and Irrigated  N - East and Central Farming and Forest
E - Rocky Mountain Range and Forest  O - Mississippi Delta Cotton and Feed Grains
F - N. Great Plains Spring Wheat  P - S. Atl. & Gulf Slope Cash Crops, Forest, Lvst.
G - W. Great Plains Range and Irrigated  R - Northeast Forage and Forest
H - W. Great Plains Winter Wheat and Range  S - North Atlantic Slope Diversified Farming
I - SW. Plateaus and Plains Range and Cotton  T - Atlantic & Gulf Coast Lowland Forest and Crop
J - SW. Prairies Cotton and Forage  U - Fla. Subtropical Fruit, Truck Crop, Range
Land Resource Regions
The model disaggregates the 48 contiguous States into 45 regions defined by the intersection of the 10 USDA farm-production regions 
and 26 land-resource regions. USMP model region nomenclature is the concatenation of abbreviations for farm production and land  






















































LA - Lake States
CB - Corn Belt
NP - Northern Plains
AP - Appalachia
SE - Southeast
DL - Delta States
SP - Southern Plains
MN - Mountain
PA - Pacific
6 Historically, not all of these programs are in effect in any 
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farm programs is voluntary and is determined endoge-
nously in response to market forces affecting the costs
and returns associated with commodity production,
participation costs, and program benefits. 
Carbon Sequestration Rates
Changes in soil-carbon levels that result from changes
in land uses or production practices are determined by
a variety of relatively local factors—including climatic
conditions, soil characteristics, historical land-use
patterns, and current management practices (Lal et al.,
1998). Data derived from field experiments are not
available in sufficient detail to account for all of these
factors across the full range of U.S. agricultural soils.
Therefore, this study uses a less precise but more
broadly applicable approach based on the IPCC
methodology for estimating the effects of changes in
land uses and/or production practices on the quantity
of carbon stored in agricultural soils (IPCC, 1997). 
Cropland Management and Land-Use 
Change to Grassland
The IPCC methodology was developed for use in
national assessments as a first-order approach to esti-
mating changes in soil-carbon levels. It uses simple
assumptions about the effects of land use and manage-
ment changes on soil-carbon stocks. The framework is
based on a 20-year inventory period and the top 30 cm
of the soil profile. The IPCC methodology also provides
guidelines and default values for estimating initial soil-
carbon stocks for land in different uses as well as
changes in soil carbon levels related to changes in land
uses or production practices that occur over the inven-
tory period. Because experimentally derived parameters
are not available for much of the United States, we
applied the default-factor values provided in the IPCC
documentation, which take into account differences in
climate, soil, disturbance history, tillage intensity,
productivity, and residue management. Estimates of
average annual sequestration rates are obtained by
subtracting soil carbon stocks at the start of the inven-
tory period from soil carbon stocks at the end of the
inventory period and dividing the results by 20. 
Climate regions in the IPCC inventory are delineated
based on average annual temperature, precipitation, and
potential evapotranspiration. Of the eight IPCC climatic
regions, six are represented in the contiguous United
States (i.e., cold temperate moist, cold temperate dry,
warm temperate moist, warm temperate dry, subtropical
moist, and subtropical dry) (Eve et al., 2001). Soil cate-
gories in the IPCC inventory are groups of taxonomic
soil orders based on a soil’s ability to store and stabilize
organic carbon. The default IPCC guidelines contain
five categories of mineral soils and one category of
organic soils (IPCC, 1997). 
To establish a set of initial soil-carbon levels for lands in
different uses, we first derive a composite native soil for
each of the 10 farm production regions. Each of these
soils is a weighted average of all of the agricultural soils
represented in the 1997 National Resources Inventory
(NRI) data points within that region (USDA, NRCS,
2000).7 Next, based on the six representative IPCC soil
groupings, IPCC assigns each composite native soil a
native soil (i.e., undisturbed) carbon stock. The IPCC
Table 4.1—USMP commodity coverage
Farm-produced Farm-produced Processed
crops livestock products
Barley Whole farm milk Eggs
Corn Cull dairy cows for slaughter Broilers
Cotton Cull dairy cows for vealT u rkeys
HayF eeder pigs Evaporated milk
Oats Cull sows for slaughter Fluid milk
RiceS laughter hogs Manufactured
Silage Beef feeder calves milk
Sorghum Beef feeder yearlings Nonfat dry milk
Soybeans Cull beef calves for slaughter Butter
Wheat Cull beef cows for slaughter American cheese
Cull bulls for slaughter Other cheese
Fed beef for slaughter Ice cream
Fed beef for commercial Ethanol
feedlotsS oybean meal
Nonfed beef for slaughter Soybean oil
Other livestock Other oilseed 















Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
7 The NRI data describe soil conditions and track land-use changes
at over 800,000 locations across the United States. While aggregat-
ing these sites to the Farm Production Region level obscures signifi-
cant variations among soils in each region, it does at least capture
more aggregate differences in productivity and climatic conditions.24 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
base factors (i.e., default parameters that account for the
effect of the historical land use on soil-carbon stocks)
are then used to determine initial carbon levels for soils
that have been under long-term cultivation and in long-
term grasslands. 
The IPCC methodology assigns native soils a base
factor of 1.0 and soils under long-term cultivation a
base factor of 0.7 (0.6 for wetland soils). That is, the
methodology assumes that long-term cultivation
decreases native soil-carbon levels by about 30
percent. Continuous hay or pasture is not explicitly
reflected in the IPCC framework. We assume that
lands in hay or pasture will accumulate soil carbon but
will not return to their native soil-carbon levels
without improved management. Hence, the method-
ology assigns a base factor of 0.9 (i.e., 10 percent less
carbon than in native soils)—which is the average of
the base factor values for soils under long-term culti-
vation and improved pasture. Improved pasture—that
is, pasture being managed for increased biomass
production through fertilizer use, irrigation, or species
selection—is included in the IPCC with a default base
factor of 1.1 (i.e., 10 percent more carbon than soils
under native conditions).
In addition to assigning base factors, the IPCC
methodology assigns tillage factors and input factors.
tillage factors are used to estimate the longrun impacts
of tillage management on soil carbon. The default
tillage factor for conventional tillage is 1.0 (i.e., no
longrun change in soil carbon over the inventory
period). Changing from conventional tillage to no-till
is assumed to increase soil carbon by 10 percent over
the 20-year inventory period (a tillage factor of 1.1).
Reduced tillage (more than 30 percent residue
remaining at planting, but less than no-till) also
increases soil carbon but to a lesser degree than no-till.
For temperate climate zones, the IPCC tillage factor
for reduced till is 1.05. In subtropical climates, the
tillage factor values are somewhat lower. 
Input factors are used to measure longrun effects of
residue management on soil carbon. Input factor values
reflect the level of biomass input to the soil. A
crop/fallow rotation is considered low input because
residue is only being produced every second year (input
factor of 0.9). Continuous annual cropping is considered
medium input, with an input factor of 1.0. Increasing
soil residue by adding a winter cover crop or putting
hay into a crop rotation is considered high input (input
factor of 1.1). To estimate changes in soil carbon on
lands that shift from crop production to grasses, we use
the base factor for continuous pasture (i.e., we assume
these lands will return to 90 percent of their native soil-
carbon levels over a 20-year period).
Given the set of initial soil-carbon conditions for lands
in different uses in each farm production region, we
apply the IPCC’s default tillage and input factors to
develop a “from-to” table showing changes in annual
soil-carbon levels associated with shifting “from” any
possible rotation-tillage system in USMP “to” another
possible rotation-tillage system (table 4.2). The “from”
management systems are assumed to have been in
place long enough for soil-carbon levels to be in a
steady state and the “to” management systems are
assumed to have been adopted for long-term use. If
land use or production practice does not change during
the inventory period, the IPCC framework assumes no
change in soil carbon. If land use or production prac-
tice does change, change in the opposite direction
results in an equal and opposite impact on soil-carbon
stocks. Because of the relatively large quantities of
potentially affected land, the values most relevant to
this analysis are the values for shifting cropland into
permanent grasses and changing from continuous
cropping with conventional tillage to continuous crop-
ping with no-till. 
Land-Use Change to Forest
For each USMP region, we develop estimates of carbon
sequestered by afforesting agricultural lands from data
in Birdsey (1996). Birdsey disaggregates the 48
contiguous States into eight forest regions and reports
per acre carbon accumulation in forests for selected tree
species in each region.8 Carbon accumulation values are
reported in 5-year intervals from year 0 (conversion
from pasture or cropland to forest) to year 120 and
reflect fully stocked timberland under average manage-
ment conditions. Carbon values are presented for trees,
soils, understory, litter, and total ecosystem.
For this analysis, we assigned to each USMP region
the tree species associated with the most geographi-
cally similar region in the Birdsey study. For regions
8 Birdsey focuses on commercially valuable species. Specifically,
southern pine in the Southeast and South Central regions, white/red
pine and fir/spruce in the Northeast and Lake State regions,
white/red pine and oak/hickory in the Central States, ponderosa
pine in the northern and southern Rocky Mountain regions, and
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with multiple tree species, we selected the species with
the highest value for accumulated ecosystem carbon
over the first 15 years of forest growth (i.e., the dura-
tion of our commitment period). We then took this
accumulated carbon value and divided it by 15 to
obtain an average annual rate of carbon sequestration
(table 4.2, fig. 4.2). Hence, our values for carbon
sequestered on lands shifted from cropland or pasture
to forest reflect average per acre annual sequestration
in trees, soils, understory, and litter over the first 15
years of growth. 
Economic Incentives for Carbon 
Sequestration: Basic Features for 
Each Activity
In calculating the net returns to the activities covered
by our carbon sequestration incentives (see box on
structure of incentives) we employ a 15-year contract
period for adoption of carbon-sequestrating land uses
and production practices. This timeframe follows
previous studies and is consistent with the historical
tendency to limit farmer commitment periods in
USDA conservation programs.9 We assume farmers
will participate when the net economic returns to
shifting land into the carbon-sequestering land uses or
production practices for 15 years exceed the net
economic returns of allocating land to the next most
profitable use for 15 years.10 Reflecting the medium-
run nature of USMP simulations, this calculation
reflects any price increases (or decreases) induced by
farm-sector adjustments to the incentives. 
Land-Use Change to Forest
The net value of the afforestation option will be the
sum of the sequestration payments plus the present
discounted value of the standing timber at the end of
15 years minus the costs of establishing trees. To
simplify the modeling exercise, we annualize these
benefits and costs, which allows us to capture their
collective net effect on producer decisions with a
single number. 
Our analysis does not offer the afforestation incentive
in the Southern Plains, Northern Plains, or the Moun-
tain regions because natural conditions do not favor
forest growth throughout much of these regions. Estab-
lishing forests in these regions would require relatively
costly human interventions (e.g., fire-suppression
activities), compared with regions in which we offer
the afforestation incentive. Nor does our analysis offer
incentives to convert lands currently enrolled in CRP.
CRP objectives include reducing soil erosion,
improving water quality, and enhancing wildlife
habitat—not all of which are necessarily compatible
with increasing carbon sequestration. Including CRP
lands in our analysis would conflate the costs and
benefits associated with carbon sequestration with
those associated with the other environmental goods
and services provided by CRP (particularly in cases
where there are tradeoffs). Consequently, we focus our
carbon sequestration incentives on land currently in
crop or livestock production. 
We derived expected per acre timber quantities, prices
per 1,000 cubic feet, and per acre values of timber at
the end of the contract period by region and prior land
use from various sources (table 4.3, figs. 4.3a-b). The
timber quantities on converted pasture and converted
cropland are from Birdsey (1996). Expected timber
prices in each region reflect average prices for timber
harvested from Federal forests between fiscal years
1996-1997 and 1999-2000 (inclusive).11 The per acre
timber values are the products of the timber quantities
and their associated prices. 
Current estimates of forest-establishment costs are not
generally available for most regions of the country but
9 Conservation programs in the Farm Security and Rural Invest-
ment Act of 2002 (i.e., the 2002 Farm Act) that contain longrun
land retirements include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
and the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP). The CRP is by far the
larger program with over 33.6 million acres enrolled as of August
2001 (USDA, FSA, 2001). CRP contracts run for 10 years. WRP
enrollment is presently about 1 million acres. WRP easements run
for 30 years or perpetuity. Additionally, except in the Pacific
region, all of the forest types used in this analysis reach their maxi-
mum annual carbon accumulation rate between 15 and 20 years.
Differences in the 15- and 20-year rates, however, are typically less
than 0.25 mt per acre per year. Given these marginal differences
and the demonstrated preference for shorter land-retirement pro-
grams, we selected 15 years as the length of our contract period. 
10 To be more precise, USMP does not operate strictly on the basis
of profit maximization. It also includes a set of parameters that
reflect the “stickiness” of decisionmaking regarding choices of
rotations and tillage systems, in response to changes in costs and
returns. That is, these parameters dampen what otherwise might be
large-scale shifts in input use and/or commodity production in the
model when costs or returns change by very small amounts but
certain economic thresholds are crossed. 
11 These prices are available on the U.S. Forest Service website:
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Table 4.2—Selected carbon-sequestration rates by USMP region, for changes in land use or 
production practice
Region From cropland F rom pasture F rom CAC* From conventional till Forest species 
to forest to forest to grassland to conservation till planted (for afforestation)
—————— Metric tons per acre per year —————
Appalachia/ N 1.724 1.028 0.383 0.134 Southern pine
Appalachia/ P, S, and T1 .573 0.9380 .383 0.134 Southern pine
Corn Belt/ L, M, N, O0 .9380 .847 0.4910 .170 White/red pine
Corn Belt/ R 1.210 1.119 0.4910 .170 White/red pine
Delta States 1.724 1.028 0.506 0.178 Southern pine
Lake States 1.3311 .240 0.425 0.150 White/red pine
Mountain States** 0.249 0.085 --
Northeast1 .210 1.119 0.384 0.134 White/red pine
Northern Plains** 0.378 0.134- -
Pacific States/A and D0 .817 0.877 0.312 0.109 Douglas fir
Pacific States/B, C, and E0 .786 0.726 0.312 0.109 Ponderosa pine
Southeast1 .573 0.9380 .329 0.113S outhern pine
Southern Plains** 0.3940 .138- -
Note: See figure 4.1 for USMP regions.
* Continuous annual cropping (CAC) reflects use of conventional tillage and moldboard plow. Depending on the region, CAC includes 
some combination of soybeans, corn, sorghum, silage, oats, wheat, barley, peas, barley, and rice. Sequestration values are generally 
lower for rotations with cotton or fallow periods and higher for rotations with hay.
** Our analysis does not offer afforestation incentives in these regions.
Sources: IPCC inventory method for cropland and grassland carbon levels (IPCC, 1997); Birdsey (1996) for forest carbon levels.
See text for detailed explanation.
Metric tons/year
Note:  See figure 4.1 for USMP regions.
CAC = continuous annual cropping.
Sources:  IPCC inventory method for cropland and grassland carbon levels (IPCC, 1997); Birdsey (1996) for forest carbon levels. 
See text for detailed explanation. 
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Table 4.3—Estimated quantities and values of timber per acre at end of 15-year carbon sequestration 
program, by farm-production region
From cropland From pastureland
Region Price Timber quantity Timber value T imber quantity Timber value 
$/1,000 cu. ft. 1,000 cubic feet Dollars 1,000 cubic feet Dollars
Appalachia 790.18 1.2951 ,023.28 0.634 500.97
Corn Belt 485.24 .461 223.70 .461 223.70
Delta 790.18 1.293 1021.70 .6324 99.39
Lake States 485.24 .644 312.99 .644 312.49
Northeast 485.24 .522 253.30 .522 253.30
Pacific6 96.92 .295 205.59. 4433 08.74
Southeast7 90.18 1.295 1023.28 .634 500.97
Note:Q u antities and dollar values are per acre.
Sources:T imber quantity source is Birdsey (1996).Timber prices source is http://www/fs.fed.us/land/fm/s_h/s_hindex.htm.
Prices reflect average prices for timber harvested from Federal forests between fiscal years 1996-1997 and 1999-2000 (inclusive).
Source: Birdsey (1996).
Estimated quantities of timber per acre at end of 15-year carbon sequestration program, 
by farm-production region
Figure 4.3a
Timber quantity on converted cropland  Timber quantity on converted pasture










Prices reflect average prices for timber harvested from Federal forests between fiscal years 1996-1997 and 1999-2000 (inclusive).
Source: http://www/fs.fed.us/land/fm/s_h/s_hindex.htm
Estimated values of timber per acre at end of 15-year carbon sequestration program, 
by farm-production region
Figure 4.3b
Timber value on converted cropland Timber value on converted pasture
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are published biannually for the South. The total cost
of seedlings, prescribed burning, and hand planting in
the Southeast in 1998 averaged about $93.29 per acre
(DuBois et al., 1999). To estimate regional forest-
establishment costs, we used State-level data on the
value and quantity of timber harvested from National
Forests in 1998 (USDA, FS, 1999) to derive a share of
harvest-weighted timber price for each farm produc-
tion region and then also for the Southeast as defined
by the Forest Service. To generate estimates of forest
establishment cost differentials for each region, we
divided the farm production region prices by the Forest
Service Southeast region price; these ratios were
multiplied by the Southeast cost estimate of $93.29 to
obtain an estimated forest-establishment cost in each
farm production region. 
Land-Use Change to Grasslands 
The net value of the grassland-conversion option will
be the sum of the annualized sequestration payments
net of the sum of annualized grassland establishment
costs. In our simulation scenarios, we assume no
revenue from the sale of co-products, such as forage or
hunting opportunities, for lands converted to perma-
nent grass.12 All cropland is considered eligible for
conversion to grasses. Pasture land, which has the
same carbon-sequestration rates as grassland in our
carbon-sequestration methodology, is not eligible for
conversion. Again, our analysis does not allow incen-
tives to convert grasslands enrolled in the CRP. Esti-
mates of grassland-establishment costs are based on
CRP data. Estimates of the carbon-sequestration rates
that provide the basis for the incentive payments are
based on the IPCC inventory methodology. 
Structure of Carbon Sequestration Incentives in USMP Simulations
Generic features
● Farmers commit to adopt carbon-sequestering
land uses and production practices for 15 years.
Commitment period begins in 2010.
● Sequestration payments are only offered for
bringing new lands into forests, grasses, or car-
bon-sequestering production practices. Hence,
forest land that stays in forest, grassland that
stays in grass, and cropland that is in, and
remains in, no-till count for zero additional
sequestration.
Afforestation
● Establishment costs—annualized over 15 years.
● Value of standing timber at the end of 15 years. 
● Payment for carbon sequestered.
● Ineligible lands: Southern Plains, Northern Plains,
or Mountain regions (throughout much of these
regions, natural conditions do not favor forest
growth). 
● No double enrollment in CRP. 
Land-use change to grassland
● Establishment costs—annualized over 15 years
(estimates based on CRP data).
● No value from sale of co-products (not used by
livestock for forage).
● Payment for carbon sequestered.
● Eligible land: all cropland in all regions. 
● No double enrollment in CRP. 
Changing production practices (i.e., adopting con-
servation tillage on carbon-sequestering rotations)
● Costs of production by rotation and by tillage 
system.
● Revenue from sale of crops (reflecting potential
yield/acre effects).
● Payment for carbon sequestered.
● Eligible land: all land in all regions where conser-
vation tillage or carbon-sequestering rotations are
currently practiced.
12 This assumption is consistent with the CRP, which limits (and
until 2002 generally prohibited) grazing or haying on enrolled
lands. Allowing lands covered by this incentive to be grazed or
hayed would make this incentive more attractive to landowners. It
would also, however, require that we specify how these lands are
managed—since management practices would affect the net
sequestration achieved. Given the example of the CRP, and the
finding in Antle et al. (2001) and McCarl and Schneider (2001)
(see chapter 3 in this report) that this land-use change would not
be competitive with other carbon-sequestration activities, we sim-
plify our analysis and omit co-products on croplands converted to
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Cropland Management
For each cropland-management activity that receives a
sequestration payment, the net value of the option to
the farmer will be the expected net revenue from the
sale of crops (reflecting any changes in yields or
acreage) plus the annualized payment for net carbon
sequestration minus the baseline net revenue of
production. For each activity, eligible lands include all
lands in regions where that activity is currently prac-
ticed. Again, estimates of the carbon-sequestration
rates that provide the basis for the incentive payments
are based on the IPCC inventory methodology. 
Model Baseline and 
Simulation Scenarios
Our carbon-sequestration incentives are assumed to
begin in 2010. To establish the baseline scenario, we
calibrate USMP to approximate the supply, demand,
production, acreage, tillage, Government program,
input cost, and other conditions projected in the USDA
baseline for 2010.13 Simulation results should be inter-
preted as reflecting differences relative to 2010, when
there are no new incentive programs targeting carbon
sequestration. To trace out the marginal cost curve for
sequestered carbon, we run each scenario with six
alternative payment levels—these payments are based
on the assumption that the value of a metric ton of
carbon emissions reduction is $10, $25, $50, $75,
$100, and $125.14 Each year during the contract
period, participants are paid for the additional metric
tons of carbon they sequester that year.
With USMP calibrated to reflect the agricultural-sector
conditions projected in the USDA baseline for 2010,
we simulate four alternative incentive scenarios (see
box on simulation scenarios). In scenario 1, our refer-
ence scenario, carbon payments are for carbon rental,
compensating for storage during the commitment
period only. The incentive program covers a 15-year
contract period. At the 5-percent discount rate
employed in the analysis, 15 years of storage is equiv-
alent to 0.354 times the “full” asset value for carbon-
emissions reduction (see table 2.5). Hence, for carbon
emissions reductions valued at $10, $25, $50, $75,
$100, and $125 per metric ton, payments to farmers
for 15 years of storage are $3.54, $8.85, $17.70,
$26.55, $35.40, and $44.25, respectively, per mt of
carbon sequestration. (For permanent storage, the
present discounted value of the total payments farmers
will receive under the rental payment format will equal
the full asset value of permanent carbon sequestration
paid at the time the carbon was put in storage.) For
purposes of clarity, in comparing the results of
different scenarios, we will refer to the six payment
levels in terms of the full asset value of emissions
reductions or permanent carbon sequestration—that is,
$10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per metric ton. 
Another key feature of scenario 1 is that payments
reflect net carbon sequestration. In other words, the
farm sector is credited for changes in land uses and/or
practices that sequester carbon and is debited for
related changes in land uses and production practices
that increase carbon emissions. Scenario 1 serves as a
reference scenario because of its incentive structure: It
accounts for the permanence issue (it pays only for the
13 Calibration of USMP to the USDA baseline projections for 2010
is not exact. The differences between prices and quantities in
USMP’s 2010 baseline and the USDA’s 2010 estimates for most
commodities are less than 1 percent. The major exceptions to this
are for beef, pork, and dairy where USMP price and quantity val-
ues more closely approximate the USDA’s estimates for 2005.
14 In our analysis, carbon payment levels are set exogenously and
provided to USMP as given. The range of payments analyzed was
chosen to be consistent with the payment levels considered in pre-
vious studies. 
Summary of Simulation Scenarios
Scenario 1: Reference scenario.
Rental payment for net sequestration during
contract period only, with no cost-share 
supplement. 
Scenario 2: A common approach to permanence in
the early literature.
Asset-value payment (assuming permanent
sequestration) for net sequestration, no cost-
share supplement. 
Scenario 3: A standard feature of USDA conserva-
tion subsidy programs.
Rental payment for net sequestration, with cost-
share supplement.
Scenario 4: Exploring the potential for emissions
“leakage” within cropland management.
Rental payment for gross sequestration, no cost-
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value of sequestration occurring during the commit-
ment period), it accounts for farm-sector leakage (it
pays only for net sequestration), and it is consistent
with the C-stock equilibrium issue (again, it pays only
for the value of sequestration occurring during the
commitment period).
Scenario 2 employs an incentive structure similar to
structures employed in many previous studies (app. 1).
Specifically, rather than receiving rental payments
covering storage during the contract period only,
farmers receive full payments for permanent storage.
As in scenario 1, farmers receive payments when the
carbon is added to the soils or biomass, and farmers
are paid only for net sequestration. 
The payment structure in scenario 2 implicitly assumes
that any sequestering activity that receives a payment
is permanent. Still nothing prevents farmers from
reverting to carbon-emitting land uses and production
practices when their contracts expire. In this case,
society would receive less carbon sequestration—and
emissions offsets—than it paid for. Specifically,
society would pay for permanent carbon storage but
receive a sequestration stream in which the carbon
sequestered in year 1 is stored for 15 years, the carbon
sequestered in year 2 is stored for 14 years, and so
forth until year 15, when the incremental carbon
sequestered is stored only for 1 year. 
On the other hand, the sequestration outcomes of the
rental program are independent of the assumption
about permanence. If sequestration is maintained
permanently, farmers will ultimately receive the same
present discounted value of sequestration payments. A
comparison of the costs between scenarios 1 and 2
provides insights on the cost effectiveness of imple-
menting carbon sequestration incentives based on the
assumption of permanence, if that assumption turns
out to be faulty.15
Scenario 3 reverts to the rental payment structure but
adds a 50-percent cost-share payment to help
landowners offset the startup costs of the desired
land-use changes—that is, afforesting cropland or
pasture and converting cropland to grasses.16 We
include this scenario because USDA conservation
programs often include cost-share assistance to help
farmers establish conservation practices. For
example, the CRP allows for a 50-percent cost-share
payment to help landowners cover tree-establishment
costs in afforestation agreements, in addition to the
annual land rental payment. Hence, scenario 3 will
provide insights on the cost effectiveness of adding a
cost-share payment to the annual per ton carbon
payment for different levels of carbon payments. To
simplify the modeling, we annualize the value of the
cost-share payment for the afforestation activity and
add it to the yearly per ton payment and the annual-
ized end-of-program timber value. Payments are
again based on net sequestration. 
Scenario 4 drops the cost-share provision and keeps
the rental payment structure but offers payments for
gross sequestration rather than net sequestration. In
other words, the per ton carbon payments credit
farmers for changes in land uses and/or practices that
sequester carbon but do not penalize them for related
changes in land uses and production practices that
increase carbon emissions. With this scenario, we can
explore the potential for farm-sector carbon leakage
related to activities that farmers undertake in
response to, but which are not included in, the
sequestration incentive set. These activities include
switching lands under conventional tillage to no-till
while simultaneously switching to conventional
tillage on land currently under no-till, or shifting
lands into trees or grasses while simultaneously
bringing idle land into production. 
15 The differential costs of using this payment system when the
true assumption is one of permanence most likely will be reflected
in a different time path of transaction costs because payments will
be made throughout the full storage period, rather than simply in
the years in which carbon is accumulating. The result is likely to
be higher total transaction costs.
16 Historically, USDA has not provided farmers with cost-share
payments for changes in production practices. Hence, our analysis
does not consider cost-share payments for changes in tillage prac-
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Empirical results were obtained from running USMP
under the four farm-sector incentive scenarios for
carbon sequestration described in chapter 4 of this
report. Tables 5.1-5.4 detail selected results for the
four simulation scenarios that capture alternative
designs for carbon-sequestration incentives. Results of
the simulation scenarios represent changes relative to
the 2010 baseline, that is, they reflect impacts beyond
those that would occur in a 2010 world with no new
carbon sequestration incentives. 
Scenario 1: Rental Payment for Net
Sequestration, No Cost-Share—
Reference Policy Scenario
Table 5.1, scenario 1 suggests that U.S. agriculture has
significant economic potential to store additional
carbon—although the amounts sequestered are well
below the levels estimated to be technically possible in
soil science studies (see table 2.2). For permanent
sequestration valued at $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and
$125 per mt, farmers receive rental payments of $3.54,
$8.85, $17.70, $26.55, $35.40, and $44.25 per mt of
carbon sequestered during the 15-year contract period.
[Remember, if they were to sequester the carbon
permanently, the present discounted value of their
receipts would be the full asset value for permanent
sequestration per ton.] At these carbon prices, the farm
sector is estimated to sequester 0.4, 6.3, 30.3, 42.8,
54.3 and 72.0 MMT of carbon per year. At the lowest
carbon price, neither of the land-use change options
appears to be economically attractive: all net seques-
tration (i.e., 0.4 MMT) results from the expanded use
of conservation tillage (fig. 5.1). At all higher payment
levels, however, afforestation accounts for 86-94
percent of total sequestration. 
The dominance of afforestation reflects the signifi-
cantly higher per acre carbon payments relative to
those for other activities—due to the significantly
higher per acre sequestration rates associated with
shifting land into trees (see table 4.2 and fig. 4.2).
Between 68 and 77 percent of the carbon from
afforestation comes from conversion of pasture, with
the share from cropland generally increasing as the
payment level rises. Pasture is generally less produc-
tive than cropland, so this pattern is consistent with
farmers afforesting more marginal lands first. No
payment level in this scenario is sufficient to induce
farmers to sequester carbon by converting cropland to
permanent grasses.1
As the asset value for permanent sequestration
increases from $10 to $125 per mt, annual carbon
sequestration from expanding conservation tillage
increases from 0.4 to 7.5 MMT. Some of the carbon
sequestered through additional use of conservation
tillage, however, is offset by other cropland manage-
ment decisions that increase carbon emissions. These
other activities include shifting land from conservation
tillage to conventional tillage, switching to rotations
with higher emissions, and bringing idle land into crop
production.2 Net emissions from these activities,
reflected in the category “other changes in cropland
Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis
1 It is important to note, however, that the simulations only incor-
porate incentives for land-use change to grassland—we do not take
into account any continuing sequestration that may occur due to
past land-use change, until a new C-stock equilibrium is reached.
Nor do we capture the sequestration potential for improved man-
agement of range or pasture because we lack cost data for the asso-
ciated activities. 
2 To track flows in and out of conservation tillage, we report the
sequestration impacts of changes into conservation tillage in the
“changes to conservation tillage” category, and the impacts of
changes out of conservation tillage in the “other changes in crop-
land management” category, along with the net impacts on carbon
sequestration of rotation changes.
Figure 5.1
Annual net carbon sequestration
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management,” increase from 0.0 to 0.5 MMT over the
range of carbon values analyzed. 
Table 5.2 reports the effects of land-use and land-
management changes associated with the carbon-
sequestration quantities reported in table 5.1. For
cropland management, at asset carbon prices of $10,
$25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per mt with scenario 1,
farmers shift, respectively, 2.1, 5.2, 10.5, 15.9, 20.3,
and 27.9 million acres from conventional tillage to
conservation tillage. The net effect of these cropland-
management decisions on carbon sequestration,
however, is partially offset by the reverse shift of some
cropland—between 0.3 and 7.3 million acres—from
conservation tillage to conventional tillage. (We
discuss the shift from conservation tillage to conven-
tional tillage in more detail for scenario 4). 
The ability of very modest carbon payments to induce
additional use of conservation tillage reflects the
sizable set of producers who base decisions to use one
system over another on marginal economic considera-
tions. In many areas, conservation and conventional
tillage systems exist side by side. In these cases, it is
Table 5.1—Average annual change in total carbon sequestered by practice/land-use change, for alternative
policy scenarios and carbon-payment levels
Price per metric ton of permanent carbon sequestration*
Activity $10 $25 $50 $75 $100 $125
Million metric tons
Scenario 1: Rental payment on net sequestration, with no cost-share:
Afforestation 0 .05 .42 8 .5 39.9 49.76 5 .0
From cropland 0.01 .76 .71 0 .61 3.3 18.5
From pasture 0.0 3.72 1 .82 9.3 36.44 6 .4
Additional grasses 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Changes to conservation tillage** 0.41 .02 .0 3.25 .07 .5
Other changes in cropland management 0.0- 0 .1- 0 .2- 0 .3 -0.4- 0 .5
Total0 .46 .3 30.3 42.85 4 .3 72.0
Scenario 2: Asset payment on net sequestration, with no cost-share:
Afforestation 8 .5 38.47 2 .41 0 3.1 125.21 33.1
From cropland 2.61 0 .22 0 .22 6 .6 33.14 0 .1
From pasture 6.02 8 .25 2 .27 6 .6 92.1 93.1
Additional grasses 0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Changes to conservation tillage** 1.12 .9 8.51 4 .02 0 .02 7 .6
Other changes in cropland management -0.1- 0 .2- 0 .5- 1 .0- 1 .0- 0 .7
Total 9.54 1 .18 0 .4 116.1 144.2 160.0
Scenario 3: Rental payment on net sequestration, with cost-share:
Afforestation 2 .81 6 .6 34.3 41.15 4 .9 68.4
From cropland 0.1 3.27 .71 0 .9 14.41 8 .8
From pasture 2.71 3.42 6 .6 30.24 0 .54 9.6
Additional grasses 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Changes to conservation tillage** 1.01 .42 .12 .8 3.54 .3
Other changes in cropland management- 0 .1- 0 .1- 0 .2- 0 .2- 0 .2- 0 .4
Total 3.71 7 .9 36.24 3.75 8 .27 2 .3
Scenario 4: Rental payment on gross sequestration, with no cost-share:
Afforestation 0 .05 .42 8 .5 39.64 7 .46 1 .1
From cropland 0.01 .76 .71 0 .61 3.3 18.5
From pasture 0.0 3.72 1 .72 9.0 34.14 2 .6
Additional grasses 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Changes to conservation tillage** 31.8 32.1 32.5 32.9 34.1 34.4
Other changes in cropland management- 31.7- 31.6- 31.6- 31.5- 31.3 -30.9
Total0 .15 .9 29.44 1 .05 0 .3 64.6
*  Corresponding payments to farmers during the 15-year contract period are $3.54, $8.85, $17.70, $26.55, $35.40, and $44.25 per mt in rental
payment scenarios 1, 3, and 4 and $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per mt in asset payment scenario 2.
** These rows report gross sequestration from changes to conservation tillage. Emission increases from changes out of conservation 
tillage are in “other changes in cropland management.”
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Table 5.2—Acres changing land use or tillage practice as a result of contract, by policy scenario 
and carbon-payment level
Price per metric ton of permanent carbon sequestration*
Activity Base $10 $25 $50 $75 $100 $125
Total acres (mil.)C h ange in acres (mil.)
Scenario 1: Rental payment on net sequestration, with no cost-share:
Change to forest land:
From cropland 00 .01 .14 .46 .9 8.71 2 .7
From pasture 00 .04 .12 4 .2 32.3 40.45 1 .9
Total change to forest0 0 .05 .22 8 .6 39.24 9.16 4 .6
Total change to grassland 00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Cropland - tillage changes:
From conventional to conservation tillage 02 .15 .21 0 .51 5 .9 20.3 27.9
From conservation to conventional tillage 00 .3 0.9 1.72 .9 3.9 7.3
Net change to conservation tillage 1.84 .3 8.81 3.01 6 .42 0 .6
Scenario 2: Asset payment on net sequestration, with no cost-share:
Change to forest land:
From cropland 01 .76 .61 3.81 8 .12 2 .52 7 .4
From pasture 06 .7 31.25 8 .68 7 .5 105.4 106.1
Total change to forest0 8 .4 37.87 2 .4 105.6 127.9 133.5
Total change to grasslands 00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .1
Cropland - tillage changes:
From conventional to conservation tillage 05 .81 4 .62 9.9 42.65 4 .3 66.9
From conservation to conventional tillage 00 .82 .46 .9 8.41 2 .01 4 .2
Net change to conservation tillage 5.01 2 .22 3.0 34.24 2 .3 52.7
Scenario 3: Rental payment on net sequestration, with cost-share:
Change to forest land:
From cropland 00 .12 .15 .07 .1 9.71 2 .9
From pasture 02 .9 14.9 29.5 33.3 45.75 6 .3
Total change to forest0 3.01 7 .0 34.54 0 .45 5 .46 9.2
Total change to grassland 00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Cropland - tillage changes:
From conventional to conservation tillage 0 3.24 .9 9.11 3.41 6 .82 1 .0
From conservation to conventional tillage 01 .71 .3 2.02 .9 2.6 3.3
Net change to conservation tillage 1.5 3.67 .11 0 .51 4 .21 7 .7
Scenario 4: Rental payment on gross sequestration, with no cost-share:
Change to forest land:
From cropland 00 .01 .14 .46 .9 8.71 2 .7
From pasture 00 .04 .12 4 .1 31.9 38.14 8 .1
Total change to forest0 0 .05 .22 8 .5 38.84 6 .86 0 .8
Total change to grassland 00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Cropland - tillage changes:
From conventional to conservation tillage 07 6 .88 0 .3 79.18 1 .58 1 .3 82.7
From conservation to conventional tillage 07 6 .17 8 .17 4 .87 4 .27 3.17 2 .6
Net change to conservation tillage 0.72 .24 .3 7.3 8.21 0 .1
*  Corresponding payments to farmers are $3.54, $8.85, $17.70, $26.55, $35.40, and $44.25 per mt in scenarios 1, 3, and 4 
and $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per mt in scenario 2.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.34 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
expected that the returns to the different tillage
systems would be fairly similar and that relatively
small carbon payments would be sufficient that some
farmers currently using conventional tillage would
maximize profits by shifting to conservation tillage. 
Across the payment levels analyzed, afforestation of
cropland and pasture increases from 0.0 to 64.6 million
acres. At payment levels of $100 per mt and below, the
Delta States, the Southeast, and Appalachia account for
the large share of acres shifting to forest (between 82
and 100 percent) (app. 2). At $100 per mt, some
afforestation occurs in all regions in which it is consid-
ered feasible, including the Pacific. 
Across the carbon-payment range analyzed, U.S. timber-
land acreage—now estimated at 503.7 million acres
(Vesterby and Krupa, 2001)—increases from 0 to 13
percent. Within USMP, we cannot currently identify at
what point substantial program-induced price and output
effects would occur through carbon-sequestration activi-
ties in forestry markets. At least for the higher carbon-
payment levels, not accounting for potential carbon
leakage in the forestry sector probably results in an over-
estimate of net sequestration. 
With respect to commodity markets, the carbon-seques-
tration incentives simulated in scenario 1 typically result
in lower output and higher prices (fig. 5.2, table 5.3).
This pattern is consistent with the observed shifts of
land out of crop and livestock production and into trees.
Commodity market impacts, however, are quite modest
for carbon payments up to $75 per mt—production
declines are all less than 1.7 percent and price increases
are all less than 1.4 percent. At a payment of $100 per
mt, some price and production impacts start to become
more substantial. The price of rice increases 2.4 percent,
production of rice drops 2.5 percent, and production of
sorghum drops 2.9 percent. At a payment level of $125
per mt, four of the nine commodities in table 5.3 have
price increases between 2.4 and 4.1 percent and three
have production declines between 2.9 and 5.6 percent.
Among the commodity markets, the most affected are
the major feed grains (corn and sorghum), rice (for
crops), and fed beef (for livestock). The effects on the
markets for wheat, soybeans, pork, and milk are rela-
tively small.
Table 5.4 reports the impacts on agricultural-sector
welfare and Government spending under alternative
policy scenarios. Aggregate producer welfare impacts
are shown as changes in net farm income and domestic
producer surplus. In USMP, net farm income nets out
variable costs while producer surplus nets out both
variable and fixed costs. For payment levels of $50 per
mt and below, increases in net farm income in scenario
1 are less than 2.0 percent. As payments increase from
$75 to $125 per mt, net farm income increases from
3.3 to 7.6 percent. 
For full carbon payments of $10, $25, $50, $75, $100,
and $125 per mt, Government payments to farmers
total $1.3 million, $55.7 million, $537.1 million,
$1,137.1 million, $1,924.4 million, and $3,181
million, respectively. For context, annual outlays
during 1989-2000 for USDA’s CRP varied between
$1.40 billion and $1.73 billion, including rental
payments, cost-share assistance, and technical assis-
tance for the 29.2 to 35.1 million enrolled acres during
the period (USDA, FSA, 2001).
The higher commodity prices and lower production
levels associated with carbon payments to producers
hurt U.S. consumers of agricultural products. This
impact is measured by changes in domestic consumer
surplus, which is the difference between the amount
that consumers would be willing to spend and the
amount they actually have to spend for a specific
quantity of a good. Reductions in consumer surplus
indicate a decline in consumer welfare. Across the
payment levels, however, declines in domestic
consumer surplus are relatively modest—between 0.0
and 0.2 percent (or never more than $1.9 billion). 
Figure 5.2
Commodity price changes
Scenario 1:  Rental payments on net sequestration
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Table 5.3—Estimated commodity market impacts, by policy scenario and carbon-payment level 
Price per metric ton of permanent carbon sequestration*
Activity $0 $10 $25 $50 $75 $100 $125
Baseline ——————  Percent change from baseline ——————
(units noted)
Scenario 1: Rental payment on net sequestration, with no cost-share:
Commodity production:
Corn 11.234 bil.b u0 .00 .0-  0 .1- 0 .1- 0 .3 -0.5
Sorghum 0.670 bil.b u- 0 .1- 0 .3 -1.0- 1 .6- 2 .9 -5.6
Wheat2 .545 bil.b u 0.00 .00 .10 .0- 0 .3 -1.0
Rice 0.194 bil. cwt   -0.1- 0 .3 -0.8- 1 .4- 2 .5- 4 .2
Soybeans 3.245 bil.b u0 .00 .00 .10 .0- 0 .7- 1 .5
Cotton 17.50 mil.b a les -0.1- 0 .2- 0 .5- 0 .9 -1.6- 2 .9
Fed beef 152.20 mil. cwt 0.0- 0 .2- 0 .3 -0.4- 0 .5- 0 .6
Pork1 8 9.80 mil. cwt0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Milk 1,794.00 mil. cwt0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0- 0 .1
Commodity prices:
Corn $2.60 bu0 .02 0.04 0.00 0.07 1.02 2.67
Sorghum$ 2.35 bu0 .09 0.21 0.350 .74 1.72 3.15
Wheat $3.70 bu- 0 .02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.27 0.98
Rice$ 7.71 cwt0 .12 0.29 0.75 1.382 .384 .01
Soybeans $6.30 bu- 0 .01 0.01 0.20 0.341 .04 1.87
Cotton$ 3 12.00 bale 0.07 0.17 0.40 0.71 1.33 2.35
Fed beef  $334.04 cwt0 .00 0.21 0.61 0.79 1.01 1.30
Pork $262.93 cwt0 .00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.34
Milk $14.30 cwt0 .00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.50 0.80 0.29
Scenario 2: Asset payment on net sequestration, with no cost-share:
Commodity production:
Corn 11.234 bil.b u0 .0- 0 .1- 0 .7- 1 .7- 3.0- 4 .1
Sorghum 0.670 bil.b u- 0 .4- 1 .5- 6 .6 -10.1 -14.4 -17.4
Wheat2 .545 bil.b u 0.00 .0- 1 .3 -3.9 -8.4 -12.1
Rice 0.194 bil. cwt   -0.3 -1.4- 5 .3 -8.3 -11.6 -16.0
Soybeans 3.245 bil.b u0 .00 .0- 1 .9 -4.2- 7 .9 -11.2
Cotton 17.50 mil.b a les -0.2- 0 .8- 3.3 -5.7- 9.5 -16.1
Fed beef 152.20 mil. cwt -0.4- 0 .4- 0 .7- 1 .1- 1 .5- 1 .9
Pork1 8 9.80 mil. cwt0 .00 .0- 0 .1- 0 .1- 0 .2- 0 .3
Milk 1,794.00 mil. cwt0 .00 .0- 0 .2- 0 .4- 0 .7- 0 .9
Commodity prices:
Corn $2.60 bu 0.04 0.06 3.53 7.79 13.351 7 .15
Sorghum$ 2.35 bu0 .22 0.68 3.68 7.77 13.47 17.29
Wheat $3.70 bu- 0 .04 -0.04 1.27 3.82 8.16 11.73
Rice$ 7.71 cwt0 .321 .305 .07 7.941 1 .06 15.23
Soybeans $6.30 bu0 .03 0.322 .29 4.49 8.18 11.31
Cotton$ 3 12.00 bale 0.19 0.67 2.71 4.68 7.76 13.14
Fed beef  $334.04 cwt0 .350 .77 1.46 2.233 . 11 3.76
Pork $262.93 cwt0 .01 0.03 0.44 0.911 .58 2.05
Milk $14.30 cwt- 0 .02 -0.06 0.41 0.971 .64 2.10
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Table 5.3—Estimated commodity market impacts, by policy scenario and carbon-payment level—Continued
Price per metric ton of permanent carbon sequestration*
Activity $0 $10 $25 $50 $75 $100 $125
Baseline ——————  Percent change from baseline ——————
(units noted)
Scenario 3: Rental payment on net sequestration, with cost-share:
Commodity production:
Corn 11.234 bil.b u0 .00 .0- 0 .10 .0- 0 .2- 0 .4
Sorghum 0.670 bil.b u- 0 .1- 0 .3 -0.8- 1 .2- 1 .7- 2 .8
Wheat2 .545 bil.b u 0.00 .00 .0- 0 .1- 0 .2- 0 .6
Rice 0.194 bil. cwt   0.00 .0- 0 .1- 0 .3 -1.0- 1 .3
Soybeans 3.245 bil.b u0 .00 .10 .20 .1- 0 .3 -0.9
Cotton 17.50 mil.b a les 0 .0- 0 .1- 0 .2- 0 .4- 0 .9 -1.2
Fed beef 152.20 mil. cwt 0.0- 0 .2- 2 .0- 0 .4- 0 .5- 0 .6
Pork1 8 9.80 mil. cwt0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Milk 1,794.00 mil. cwt0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Commodity prices:
Corn $2.60 bu- 0 .03 -0.12 -0.25 -0.28 0.12 1.19
Sorghum$ 2.35 bu0 .05 0.06 0.21 0.55 1.16 1.64
Wheat $3.70 bu0 .00 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.22 0.58
Rice$ 7.71 cwt0 .01 0.04 0.08 0.321 .00 1.20
Soybeans $6.30 bu0 .00 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.65 1.27
Cotton$ 3 12.00 bale 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.320 .70 0.98
Fed beef  $334.04 cwt0 .06 0.351 .78 0.81 1.01 1.25
Pork $262.93 cwt0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.18
Milk $14.30 cwt- 0 .01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 0.04 0.20
Scenario 4: Rental payment on gross sequestration, with no cost-share:
Commodity production:
Corn 11.234 bil.b u0 .00 .0- 0 .1- 0 .1- 0 .1- 0 .2
Sorghum 0.670 bil.b u- 0 .1- 0 .2- 0 .8- 1 .1- 1 .5- 2 .1
Wheat2 .545 bil.b u 0.0- 0 .1- 0 .2- 0 .3 -0.4- 0 .7
Rice 0.194 bil. cwt   -0.1- 0 .3 -0.5- 0 .8- 1 .1- 2 .0
Soybeans 3.245 bil.b u0 .00 .00 .10 .20   .1- 0 .3
Cotton 17.50 mil.b a les 0 .00 .00 .00 .0- 0 .1- 0 .4
Fed beef 152.20 mil. cwt 0.00 .0- 0 .3 -0.4- 0 .5- 0 .5
Pork1 8 9.80 mil. cwt0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Milk 1,794.00 mil. cwt0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Commodity prices:
Corn $2.60 bu0 .01 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.68
Sorghum$ 2.35 bu0 .05 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.51 0.90
Wheat $3.70 bu0 .04 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.41 0.68
Rice$ 7.71 cwt0 .10 0.26 0.52 0.77 1.06 1.87
Soybeans $6.30 bu- 0 .02 -0.01 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.70
Cotton$ 3 12.00 bale 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.32
Fed beef  $334.04 cwt0 .00 0.09 0.60 0.78 0.921 .10
Pork $262.93 cwt0 .00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11
Milk $14.30 cwt0 .00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.09
bu = bushel. cwt = hundredweight.
*  Corresponding payments to farmers are $3.54, $8.85, $17.70, $26.55, $35.40, and $44.25 per mt in scenarios 1, 3, and 4 
and $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per mt in scenario 2.
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Table 5.4—Estimated changes in annual farm income and agricultural sector welfare, by policy 
scenario and carbon-payment level 
Price per metric ton of permanent carbon sequestration*
Activity $0 $10 $25 $50 $75 $100 $125
Baseline ——————  Percent change from baseline ——————
(units noted)
Scenario 1: Rental payment on net sequestration, with no cost-share:
Net farm income: $76.937 bil. 0.00 .21 .9 3.3 4.9 7.6
Value of crop production$ 80.027 bil. 0.00 .00 .10 .10 .3 0.6
Variable crop production costs$ 44.695 bil. 0.10 .20 .3 0.4- 0 .1- 1 .0
Value of livestock production$ 110.667 bil. 0.00 .00 .40 .50 .81 .2
Variable livestock production costs  $74.064 bil. 0.00 .0- 0 .2- 0 .3 0.10 .6
Payments to farmers for:
New rotations and tillage systems 
(in mil.$ ) $0.01 .3 8.0 32.17 7 .2 164.0 306.9
Planting trees/grasses (in mil.$ ) $0.00 .04 7 .7 505.01 ,059.9 1,760.42 ,874.1
Surplus measures:
Domestic consumer surplus$ 832,469.8 mil. 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.13 -0.22
Domestic producer surplus$ 53,371.2 mil. 0.00 0.10 1.00 1.944 .14 7.45
Foreign consumer surplus$ 25,759.1 mil. -0.01 -0.06 -0.28 -0.45 -1.21 -2.40
Foreign producer surplus  $954.3 mil. 0.00 0.15 1.03 1.341 .73 2.30
Scenario 2: Asset payment on net sequestration, with no cost-share:
Net farm income: $76.937 bil. 0.4 3.0 9.21 7 .72 7 .9 37.3
Value of crop production$  80.027 bil. 0.10 .10 .81 .52 .22 .2
Variable crop production costs$ 44.695 bil. 0.20 .4- 1 .4- 3.4- 6 .8 -10.1
Value of livestock production$ 110.667 bil. 0.10 .51 .42 .3 3.54 .3
Variable livestock production costs  $74.064 bil. -0.1- 0 .20 .9 2.2 3.9 5.1
Payments to farmers for:
New rotations and tillage systems 
(in mil.$ ) $0.0 9.86 7 .5 399.8 977.01 ,912.5 3,357.6
Planting trees/grasses (in mil.$ ) $0.08 5 .5 960.3 3,619.07 ,735.61 2 ,519.41 6 ,645.2
Surplus measures:
Domestic consumer surplus$ 832,469.8 mil. -0.01 -0.07 -0.26 -0.50 -0.81 -1.05
Domestic producer surplus$ 53,371.2 mil. 0.17 1.78 9.41 19.893 4.42 48.00
Foreign consumer surplus$ 25,759.1 mil. -0.08 -0.43 -2.98- 6 .06 -10.42 -13.96
Foreign producer surplus  $954.3 mil. 0.24 1.312 .66 4.28 5.917 .19
Scenario 3: Rental payment on net sequestration, with cost-share:
Net farm income: $76.937 bil. 0.10 .9 2.5 3.45 .17 .4
Value of crop production$ 80.027 bil. 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .2
Variable crop production costs$ 44.695 bil. 0.10 .10 .3 0.40 .1- 0 .5
Value of livestock production$ 110.667 bil. 0.00 .20 .50 .50 .11 .1
Variable livestock production costs  $74.064 bil. 0.0- 0 .1- 0 .3 -0.40 .00 .3
Payments to farmers for:
New rotations and tillage systems 
(in mil.$ ) $0.0 3.01 1 .1 33.46 9.8 115.6 171.4
Planting trees/grasses (in mil.$ ) ** $0.0 9.9 147.1 607.9 1,091.41 ,945.1 3,026.0
Surplus measures:
Domestic consumer surplus$ 832,469.8 mil. 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.16
Domestic producer surplus$ 53,371.2 mil. 0.04 0.41 1.22 2.01 3.74 6.34
Foreign consumer surplus$ 25,759.1 mil. -0.01 -0.08 -0.19 -0.25 -0.69 -1.41
Foreign producer surplus  $954.3 mil. 0.10 0.58 1.24 1.39 1.77 2.27
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Since the United States is a major importer and
exporter of agricultural products, changes in U.S.
commodity prices and production would also affect
foreign producers and consumers. These impacts are
measured in USMP as changes in foreign producer
surplus and foreign consumer surplus. Following the
pattern of domestic impacts, foreign consumers are
negatively affected by the carbon payments while
foreign producers benefit. Across payment levels,
reductions in foreign consumer surplus range from
0.01 to 2.4 percent. In relative terms, the negative
impacts of the carbon payments are significantly
higher for foreign consumers than for U.S. consumers.
Conversely, foreign producers receive no carbon
payments so their gains are relatively small, compared
with gains of domestic producers. 
Scenario 2: Asset Payment (Assuming 
Permanent Sequestration) for Net 
Sequestration, No Cost-Share—Traditional
Approach to Permanence
Scenario 2 most closely represents the traditional static
approach to modeling incentive payments to encourage
farmers to adopt carbon-sequestering land uses and/or
production practices, developed in the early economic
literature on farm sequestration (see Parks and Hardie,
1995: Antle et al., 2001; and Pautsch et al., 2001). The
payment structure implicitly assumes that a unit of
carbon sequestered in a given year will be permanently
removed from the atmosphere. From this perspective, a
unit of carbon sequestration has the same GHG-miti-
gation value as a similar unit of carbon emissions
reduction. Hence, in scenario 2, farmers receive
payments equal to the full asset value of permanent
carbon sequestration rather than the 15-year rental
payments they received in scenario 1. 
Because payments to farmers per mt of carbon
sequestered in scenario 2 are 2.8 times the amount
received in scenario 1 (i.e., 1 / 0.354 = 2.8), the antici-
pated effect of using the “full” (i.e., emissions reduc-
tion) values will be to increase the levels of
sequestration activities and of economic impacts for the
various payment levels relative to the levels observed
for scenario 1. Inspection of tables 5.1-5.4 and figure
5.3 reveals this to be the case. As we would expect, the
empirical results for the $25 per mt simulation of
scenario 2 (which represents a carbon asset value of
$71) are very similar in direction and magnitude to
results for the $75 per mt simulation of scenario 1. 
Annual net carbon sequestration in scenario 2 ranges
from 9.5 MMT for a payment level of $10 per mt to
160.0 MMT per year for a payment of $125 per mt,
Table 5.4—Estimated changes in annual farm income and agricultural sector welfare, by policy 
scenario and carbon-payment level—Continued
Price per metric ton of permanent carbon sequestration*
Activity $0 $10 $25 $50 $75 $100 $125
Baseline ——————  Percent change from baseline ——————
(units noted)
Scenario 4: Rental payment on gross sequestration, with no cost-share:
Net farm income: $76.937 bil. 0.10 .62 .74 .45 .9 8.1
Value of crop production$ 80.027 bil. 0.00 .00 .10 .10 .10 .3
Variable crop production costs$ 44.695 bil. 0.00 .10 .10 .20 .2- 0 .1
Value of livestock production$ 110.667 bil. 0.00 .00 .40 .50 .70 .9
Variable livestock production costs  $74.064 bil. 0.00 .0- 0 .2- 0 .3 -0.20 .1
Payments to farmers for:
New rotations and tillage systems 
(in mil.$ ) $0.0 112.8 284.2 575.68 7 3.61 ,207.51 ,523.9
Planting trees/grasses (in mil.$ ) $0.00 .04 7 .75 0 3.71 ,050.81 ,678.22 ,703.8
Surplus measures:
Domestic consumer surplus$ 832,469.8 mil. 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.12
Domestic producer surplus$ 53,371.2 mil. 0.18 0.58 1.92 3.25 4.79 7.24
Foreign consumer surplus$ 25,759.1 mil. 0.00 -0.04 -0.22 -0.32- 0 .45 -0.96
Foreign producer surplus  $954.3 mil. 0.00 0.15 1.04 1.351 .61 2.04
*  Corresponding payments to farmers are $3.54, $8.85, $17.70, $26.55, $35.40, and $44.25 per mt in scenarios 1, 3, and 4 
and $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per mt in scenario 2.
** Includes cost-share payments.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 39
compared with a range of 0.4 to 72.0 MMT per year for
scenario 1 (table 5.1). The increases in carbon seques-
tration relative to scenario 1 are the result of farmers
responding to the higher payment levels by making
more changes in land uses and production practices. 
Unlike scenario 1, afforestation dominates sequestra-
tion activities in scenario 2 at all payment levels—
although there is a general decrease in the share of
sequestration accounted for by afforestation in
scenario 2 as the payment level increases. Relative to
scenario 1, afforestation accounts for a larger share
of total carbon sequestration for payments of $10
and $25 per mt and a smaller share of the total
sequestration for payments of $50 per mt and above.
Turning to land-use change, land afforested increases
from 8.4 million acres at a payment of $10 per mt to
133.5 million acres at a payment of $125 per mt. As
in scenario 1, afforestation is dominated by land
shifting out of pasture; however, the share of
afforested lands related to pasture conversions is
somewhat smaller in scenario 2—at least when
permanent sequestration is valued at $25 per mt or
more (70-74 percent in scenario 2 versus 78-85
percent in scenario 1).
Regional patterns of afforestation differ significantly
between scenarios 1 and 2 (app. 2). While the Delta
States, Appalachia, and the Southeast still provide
virtually all of the afforested acres at payment levels
of $10 and $25 per mt, at $50 per mt, the quantity of
additional pasture available for conversion to trees in
these regions starts to become more limited. At
payment levels of $50 per mt and above, the Pacific
region becomes the largest supplier of afforested
acres, and, producers in the Lake States and the Corn
Belt become much more active—that is, relative to
scenario 1—with afforestation. 
With respect to cropland management, carbon
payments of $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per
mt induce farmers to shift, respectively, 5.8, 14.6, 29.9,
42.6, 54.3, and 66.9 million acres from conventional
tillage to conservation tillage systems (table 5.2).
Across payment levels, these amounts are about 2.5
times the acres that make this shift relative to the asso-
ciated discount payment levels in scenario 1. The
carbon sequestration on lands moving from conven-
tional to conservation tillage, however, is offset some-
what by emissions from land moving in the opposite
direction. Shifts from conservation to conventional
tillage systems increase from 0.8 million acres for a
payment of $10 per mt to 14.2 million acres for a
payment of $125 per mt. When carbon emissions from
these land management changes are added to the net
emissions related to changes in rotations, net carbon
sequestration from cropland management is 1.0, 2.7,
8.0, 13.0, 19.0, and 26.9 MMT for payment levels of
$10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per MT, respec-
tively. Cropland management assumes a larger share of
total sequestration activity as the carbon payment
increases, rising from about 10 percent of total net
sequestration at $10 per mt to about 17 percent of total
net sequestration at a payment of $125. 
As in scenario 1, conversion of cropland to grassland
is not economically attractive across the range of
carbon payments analyzed. However, the “full” carbon
payment of $125 per mt in scenario 2 appears to be a
threshold price for conversions of cropland to perma-
nent grasses. At that payment level, 100,000 acres of
cropland in the Southern Plains shift to grasses,
resulting in about 0.032 MMT of carbon sequestration.
In understanding the limited appeal of grasslands, it is
important to note that while the per ton carbon
payments significantly increase the incentives to
convert cropland to grasses, the opportunity costs of
removing cropland from production also significantly
increase due to the crop price increases. While the
actual carbon payments to farmers are much higher in
scenario 2 relative to scenario 1, the increases in
commodity prices are much higher as well—because
larger quantities of land are being afforested leading to
greater decreases in commodity production. 
Figure 5.3
Annual net carbon sequestration
Asset (S2) versus rental (S1) net sequestration payments
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
C sequestration (MMT)
Total net seq (S2, asset)
Ag soil seq (S1, rental)










0 25 50 75 100 125
Total net seq (S1, rental)
Ag soil seq (S2, asset)40 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
These results strongly reinforce the scenario 1 finding
that, while technically feasible, conversion of cropland
to grassland does not appear to be an economically
feasible option to sequester carbon in the farm sector.
This finding is consistent with studies by Antle et al.
and McCarl and Schneider.
In scenario 2, commodity market impacts are still
quite modest for carbon payments of $10 and $25
per mt—all production declines are less than 1.5
percent and all price increases are less than 1.3
percent (table 5.3). At $50 per mt, commodity
market impacts start to become more pronounced. Of
the nine commodities shown in table 5.3, three have
price increases larger than 3 percent and three have
production declines greater than 3 percent. For
carbon payments of $100 per mt and above, double-
digit decreases in production and increases in prices
are common. The commodity markets most affected
by the sequestration incentives are corn, sorghum,
rice, and cotton. Conversely, the markets for wheat,
pork, and milk are relatively unaffected. 
The farm sector income and welfare impacts associated
with scenario 2 are also magnified versions of their
counterpart impacts in scenario 1 (table 5.4). Table 5.4
highlights how costly it could be to design a set of
carbon sequestration incentives based on an assumption
of permanent carbon storage but without actually incor-
porating any features to ensure permanent storage. For
payment levels of $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125
per mt, annual program costs are $100 million, $1.03
billion, $4.02 billion, $8.17 billion, $14.43 billion, and
$20.00 billion, respectively. These amounts are 73.3,
18.5, 7.5, 7.6, 7.5, and 6.3 times higher than the associ-
ated payment levels in scenario 1. In addition to the
higher program costs, there are also additional costs to
consumers of U.S. agricultural commodities associated
with the higher commodity prices. Focusing on U.S.
consumers, the decreases in consumer surplus for
payments of $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per mt
are, respectively, $83.3 million, $583 million, $2.2
billion, $4.2 billion, $6.7 billion, and $8.7 billion. For
the associated payments, these represent increased costs
to U.S. consumers of about $83 million, $500 million,
$1.6 billion, $3.6 billion, 5.6 billion, and 6.9 billion
relative to scenario 1. 
Alternatively, we can reinterpret the actual payments
in scenario 2 within a rental payment framework (as
per scenario 1) or we can reinterpret the actual
payments in scenario 1 in a “full” payment framework
(as per scenario 2). Viewed this way, the sequestration
results of the two scenarios can be combined to form a
single supply schedule for carbon—with the two alter-
native interpretations.
Reinterpreting actual payment levels in scenario 2 of
$10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 as rental
payments, we calculate the associated full prices by
multiplying each by 2.8 (1/.354), yielding full prices
of $28, $70, $140, $210, $280, and $350 per mt. The
axes for the combined supply function in figure 5.4 are
labeled from the rental payments perspective. We
could alternatively interpret the graph within a full
payments perspective by dividing all the prices on the
horizontal axis by 2.8.
Scenario 3: Rental Payment for Net 
Sequestration, With Cost-Share 
Supplement—Standard 
Conservation Program Feature
Scenario 3 employs the reference scenario rental
payments structure but augments the incentive
package in scenario 1 to include a cost-share subsidy
to partially offset the upfront costs of establishing
trees on cropland or pasture or establishing perma-
nent grasses on cropland. Assistance is set at 50
percent of the cost of establishing trees and grasses.3
Figure 5.4
Annual net carbon sequestration
Actual payments in S1 and S2 interpreted as rental payments
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
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3 USDA’s largest conservation program, the CRP, includes a 50-
percent cost-share payment for planting trees, establishing grasses,
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As discussed in chapter 4, cost sharing the establish-
ment of desired land uses and management practices
is a common component of USDA conservation
programs, including CRP, WRP, and WHIP.
Not surprisingly, the addition of the cost-share subsidy
results in more carbon sequestration, more afforesta-
tion, and higher levels of total payments to producers
in scenario 3 than in scenario 1. The differences in the
quantities of carbon sequestered and land afforested,
however, are only pronounced at lower payment levels.
For example, annual net carbon sequestration in
scenario 3 is 3.7, 17.9, 36.2, 43.7, 58.2, and 72.3
MMT for carbon payments of $10, $25, $50, $75,
$100, and $125 per mt, respectively (table 5.1). These
values are 9.3, 2.8, 1.2, 1.0, 1.1, 1.0 times the associ-
ated sequestration values in scenario 1. A similar
pattern is evident in the results for afforestation. This
pattern is not surprising, since the cost-share is a fixed-
dollar amount per acre; consequently, the cost-share
increases the total payments available to a much
greater extent at low carbon prices. As in scenario 1,
afforestation is concentrated in the Southeast, the Delta
States, and Appalachia, with the Pacific becoming a
source of afforested acres at carbon-payment levels of
$100 per mt and above (app. 2).
The major economic impact associated with adding
cost-share assistance to scenario 1 is a significant
increase in the cost of the sequestration program. Rela-
tive to scenario 1, cost-share assistance increases net
carbon sequestration 3.3, 11.6, 5.9, 0.9, 3.9, and 0.3
MMT for payment levels of $10, $25, $50, $75, $100,
and $125 per mt, respectively (table 5.1). The associ-
ated increases in total payments to farmers, however,
are $11.6 million, $102.5 million, $104.2 million,
$24.1 million, $136.3 million, and $16.4 million. Also
worth noting is that the effect of cost-share assistance
on net farm income essentially disappears at carbon
payments above $75 per mt. For payments of $10,
$25, $50, $75, $100, and $125 per mt, net farm
income increases, respectively, 0.0, 0.2, 1.9, 3.3, 4.9,
and 7.6 percent in scenario 1, and, 0.1, 0.9, 2.5, 3.4,
5.1, and 7.4 percent in scenario 3 (table 5.4).
Scenario 4: Rental Payment for 
Gross Sequestration, No Cost-Share—
Exploring the Leakage Issue
Scenario 4 differs from scenario 1 in that the incentive
payments are based on gross, rather than net, increases
in carbon sequestration. That is, scenario 4 pays the
farm sector when land is shifted into a carbon-seques-
tering land use or production practice but does not debit
these payments for any related land-based emissions
due to shifting cropland out of conservation tillage,
switching to rotations that release additional carbon, or
bringing idle land into crop production. A comparison
of the impacts of scenarios 1 and 4 suggests the conse-
quences of ignoring the potential for feedback effects on
market prices, which, in turn, can lead to farm-sector
choices that result in emissions from the covered activi-
ties. Again, we note that our model is limited to the
agricultural sector, so potential leakage due to related
activities in the forest sector is not included in the GHG
accounting. 
For carbon values of $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and
$125 per mt, net carbon sequestration in scenario 4 is
0.1, 5.9, 29.4, 41.0, 50.3, and 64.6 MMT, respectively
(table 5.1). Across payment levels, these values range
between 0.3 and 7.4 MMT less than annual net seques-
tration values reported for scenario 1. The similarity in
the net sequestration values is due to similarities in
afforested acres, which typically account for more than
90 percent of all sequestration in both scenarios. Rela-
tive to scenario 1, acres of cropland moving into trees in
scenario 4 are nearly identical for all payment levels,
though acres of pasture moving to trees shows modest
decreases at payment levels of $100 per mt and above
(table 5.2). Since afforestation decisions in our simula-
tions cannot be offset by related decisions to harvest
other forests, forest-related land-use change is strictly a
carbon-sequestering activity in our accounting. It is not
surprising then that afforestation decisions are largely
unaffected by the change in incentives between
scenarios 1 and 4. Hence, we focus here on the results
relating to changes in cropland management. Within
that set of activities in scenario 4, net carbon sequestra-
tion falls by about 50 percent across the range of carbon
payments.
For carbon payments of $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and
$125 per mt, total payments to farmers for changes in
tillage systems and rotations are, respectively, $112.8
million, $284.2 million, $575.6 million, $873.6 million,
$1,207.5 million, and $1,523.9 million in scenario 4.
These amounts range from 10.8 to 87.0 times the total
payments values in scenario 1. Land-management
changes help explain the smaller quantities of net
sequestration and higher program costs in scenario 4.
For carbon payments of $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, and
$125 per mt, farmers in scenario 4 shift, respectively,
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conventional to conservation tillage systems. These
land-management decisions are a direct response to the
carbon-sequestration incentives. At the same time,
however, farmers also shift 76.1, 78.1, 74.8, 74.2, 73.1,
and 72.6 million acres out of conservation into conven-
tional tillage systems. Unlike scenario 1, scenario 4
does not adjust the payments farmers receive for any
land-based emissions that result from scenario-driven
shifts of land to uses or production practices with higher
carbon emissions. Hence, there is no penalty for moving
land from conservation to conventional tillage, whereas
there is an opportunity cost associated with leaving
many lands in conservation tillage. 
At this point, we need to ask whether the large shifts
out of conservation tillage suggested by scenario 4 are
likely to occur. Based on profit calculations, the shifts
both to and from conservation tillage make sense as
responses to both carbon incentive and crop price
effects, as we outline in the paragraph that follows.
However, this component of the model may not incor-
porate sufficient “stickiness” in the choice of tillage at
a particular site, so we may be overpredicting the gross
shifts from conventional to conservation and from
conservation to conventional. The model does incorpo-
rate stickiness in the net changes among tillage
options. Consequently, the “excessive” responsiveness
would not affect the estimates of net sequestration but
would affect the estimates of program cost (which are
based on gross sequestration). 
The relative profitability of conventional tillage versus
conservation tillage depends on a variety of site-specific
factors that affect yields and cost differentials. These
factors include soil temperature and moisture conditions
at planting time (conventional tillage allows soils to
warm up and/or dry out quicker), length of growing
season (crops with longer growing seasons need to be
planted earlier and so in many areas rotations include 2
or 3 years of conservation tillage and one of conven-
tional tillage), and farmer experience with conservation
tillage (these systems tend to be management intensive
and require sufficient time to learn). 
In USMP, crop yields by rotation, tillage system, and
region are derived from the biophysical Environmental
Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model. The yields
represent 7-year averages after the crop-rotation tillage-
system region combination has been established for at
least 5 years. For many region-rotation combinations,
these yields are higher with conservation tillage
systems, but on average yields tend to be lower. In the
crop budgets used in the model, the direction of the cost
differential also varies but tends to favor conservation
tillage. For systems in which conservation tillage has
lower costs but lower yields, crop price will affect the
likelihood of revenue loss exceeding the cost gain: as
crop prices rise conventional tillage tends to become
more profitable. Thus, increasing carbon prices (from 0)
will encourage shifts toward conservation tillage. And
increasing crop prices due to shifts of cropland to forest
lands will provide incentives to shift from conservation
tillage to conventional tillage on lands where the cost
advantage of conservation is outweighed by the revenue
disadvantage as crop prices rise. 
Commodity market impacts in scenario 4 tend to be
somewhat muted versions of their counterparts in
scenario 1 (table 5.3). Without a penalty for land-based
emissions, it is profitable for farmers to bring some
idle lands into commodity production. As a result, the
decline in total cropland is not as large as in scenario
1, and the decreases in commodity production and
increases in commodity prices are also more moderate. 
Finally, scenarios 1 and 4 are similar with respect to
changes in net farm income and agricultural sector
welfare relative to the baseline. In scenario 4, the
larger increases in program payments for changes in
tillage systems are offset by smaller increases in net
revenues from crop and livestock production (due to
smaller decreases in quantities produced and smaller
increases in prices) and marginally smaller payments
for afforestation. Hence, the main consequences of
ignoring the leakage issue in the design of a farm
sector carbon-sequestration program will be that, at a
given carbon price, the quantity of net carbon seques-
tration will be lower and the program cost will be
higher. Both effects increase the per ton cost of net
carbon sequestration. 
Directions for Future Research
The changes in land uses and production practices
considered in this analysis are likely candidates for
incentives to increase the quantity of carbon stored in
agricultural soils and biomass. However, to address the
questions of the economic potential for overall GHG
mitigation in the agricultural sector, it would be
informative to extend the analysis in several directions. 
First, it would be useful to expand the scope of the
incentive payments to include a broader set of mitigation
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management, as well as a broader set of GHGs, particu-
larly methane and nitrous oxide. 
Second, it would be useful to link a framework such as
ours with a forest sector model to account for potential
carbon leakage related to forest-sector responses to
afforestation decisions on agricultural lands. As noted
in chapter 3, agriculture and forestry often compete for
the services of land resources. Several studies have
looked at this competition and concluded that the
shifting of millions of acres of cropland and pasture
into trees would change timber harvest patterns in
ways that would increase carbon emissions (see app.
1). These studies indicate that ignoring this leakage
altogether could result in crediting agricultural
afforestation programs with significantly more seques-
tration than actually occurs. 
Finally, any assessment of the relative cost-effectiveness
of different incentives to change agricultural land uses
and production practices to mitigate GHG emissions
needs to reflect the associated institutional costs associ-
ated with measuring, monitoring, and crediting the
carbon sequestered for the different policy approaches.
The carbon sequestration activities analyzed here—and
those not analyzed (see table 2.2)—pose a wide variety
of challenges with respect to carbon accounting and
contract compliance over time. Hence, the costs associ-
ated with implementing and administering these activi-
ties within a Government carbon-sequestration program
are likely to vary significantly. To date, however, all
economic studies that have assessed potential to
sequester carbon in the farm sector—including our
study and those summarized in chapter 3—have
assumed a costless institutional process. 44 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
Strategies that have been proposed to mitigate global
climate change typically focus on reducing energy-
related emissions of greenhouse gases (including
carbon dioxide) into the atmosphere. But atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) can also be
reduced by withdrawing carbon from the atmosphere
and storing—or sequestering—it in soils and biomass.
In examining the economics of sequestering additional
carbon in the U.S. farm sector through changes in agri-
cultural land use and management practices, this study
focused on two questions:
● How much of the estimated “technical potential” for
carbon sequestration is economically feasible?
● How cost effective are alternative incentive struc-
tures that might be used to encourage carbon
sequestering activities?
To address these questions, we adapted ERS’s U.S. Agri-
cultural Sector Model to include financial incentives to
agricultural producers for additional carbon sequestered
as a result of changes in land use (e.g., converting crop-
land to grassland or forest) or cropland management
practices (e.g., using conservation tillage or alternative
crop rotations). We analyzed how land use and manage-
ment practices change as financial incentives vary in four
policy-relevant dimensions:
● Asset or rental basis—Comparing “asset” pay-
ments that implicitly assume carbon is permanently
sequestered with “rental” payments for carbon stor-
age over a specified period of time,
● Level—Comparing payments ranging from $10 to
$125 per ton of carbon permanently sequestered,
● Symmetric or one-sided—Comparing a scenario in
which producers are paid for carbon sequestered
with a scenario in which producers are paid for car-
bon sequestered and charged for carbon emitted, and
● Type—Comparing scenarios in which carbon pay-
ments are augmented with a cost-share subsidy for
converting cropland or pasture to forest or converting
cropland to grassland.
In brief, we find that the asset or rental basis and the
level of incentive payments are critical in determining
how much carbon is sequestered, how it is
sequestered, how long it is sequestered, where it is
sequestered, and at what cost it is sequestered. But
even at the highest level of incentive payments consid-
ered, less than two-thirds of the technical potential for
carbon sequestration is economically feasible. Further,
incentive systems in which producers are paid for
carbon sequestered and charged for carbon emitted are
much more cost effective than systems without charges
for emissions. However, adding a cost-share subsidy
for changes in land use does not substantially improve
cost effectiveness relative to a system based on
payments per ton of carbon sequestered.
Asset or Rental Basis of 
Incentive Payments 
The effect of changes in land use or land-management
practices on atmospheric concentrations of GHGs
depends on the length of time for which carbon is
sequestered. Cropland converted from conventional
tillage to conservation tillage is estimated to sequester
additional carbon for a period of 20-30 years until a
new carbon equilibrium is reached. The additional
carbon will remain stored in the soil or biomass as
long as the land remains in conservation tillage, but
most of it will be quickly released into the atmosphere
if the land goes back into conventional tillage. Simi-
larly, cropland converted to forest will sequester addi-
tional carbon for 20-70 years, depending on timber
growth rates and harvest decisions, but most of the
additional carbon may be released if/when the timber
is harvested.
A unit of carbon sequestration in soil or biomass is
equivalent to a unit of GHG emissions reduction if
(and only if) the carbon remains sequestered perma-
nently. This requires maintaining the carbon-seques-
tering activity permanently—either with a one-time
permanent commitment or with a series of contracts
extending through time.
Early research on the economics of carbon sequestra-
tion assumed that agricultural producers who received
incentives to switch to carbon-sequestering land uses
or management practices would maintain those prac-
tices permanently after the new carbon equilibrium
was reached (and the incentive payments ceased). If
producers switched out of the sequestering activities
after payments ceased, however, the additional carbon
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would be released. Traditional research on agricultural
carbon sequestration, which was based on this assump-
tion, would then overestimate the amount of additional
carbon sequestered, and incentive programs based on
this assumption would overpay producers for the
amount of additional carbon actually sequestered.
More recent research considers a system in which
producers receive proportionally smaller “rental”
payments to store additional carbon for a finite
contract period. Payments cease at the end of the
contract period, on the assumption that the seques-
tering activity then will be discontinued (and the addi-
tional carbon released). If producers continue the
sequestering activity after the contract ends, however,
the additional carbon remains stored in the soil or
biomass. Research based on this assumption would
then underestimate the amount of additional carbon
sequestered, and incentive programs based on this
assumption would underpay producers for the amount
of additional carbon actually sequestered. If rental
contracts are renewed indefinitely, payments will equal
those provided under the “asset payment” system.
Unlike with the asset payment system, however,
permanent sequestration will be assured under a series
of indefinitely renewed rental contracts.
The difficulty in choosing between the two assump-
tions/payment systems is that we do not know how
many producers would actually continue carbon-
sequestering activities after incentive payments cease.
Continuation would depend on a combination of farm,
producer, and market conditions. We analyze both
systems to estimate a range of possible outcomes.
Lastly, adoption of agricultural activities that sequester
carbon will add to the stock of carbon in soil or biomass
for decades, but only until a new carbon equilibrium is
reached. Permanent maintenance of the sequestering
activities will store the added carbon permanently. But
even permanent terrestrial sequestration can only serve
as a “bridge” until new (low- or no-carbon) energy tech-
nologies are developed and adopted. Carbon sequestra-
tion in soil and biomass cannot offset increasing
emissions of GHGs indefinitely.
Level of Incentive Payments
The amount of carbon that can feasibly be sequestered
through changes in agricultural land use or management
practices depends not only on the asset or rental basis of
incentive payments but also on the level of incentive
payments. We evaluated a range of incentive levels
corresponding to payments of $10 to $125 per ton of
permanent carbon sequestration. 
We used two alternative payment systems to estimate
how much carbon would be sequestered under 15-year
contracts for a range of incentive levels. Under the asset
payment system, producers receive the full $10 to
$125 per ton over the 15-year contract period (on the
assumption that they will continue the sequestering
activities after the contract ends and the additional
carbon will be permanently sequestered). Under the
rental payment system, producers receive a share of
the value of permanent sequestration in exchange for
15 years of storage of additional carbon (on the
assumption that to discontinue the sequestering activi-
ties after the contract ends, they will require additional
payments). At a 5-percent discount rate, the correspon-
ding rental payments amount to $4 to $44 per ton of
carbon over the contract period.
In the absence of incentive payments, about 4 MMT of
additional carbon are currently sequestered in agricul-
tural soils in the United States each year. With incen-
tive payments corresponding to $10 per ton of
permanent carbon sequestration, results suggest that
producers would change land-use and land-manage-
ment practices to the extent that an additional 0.4
MMT would be sequestered under the rental payment
system per year and an additional 10 MMT would be
sequestered under the asset payment system. Within
this range, the actual amount of additional sequestra-
tion would depend on the extent to which producers
continue carbon-sequestering activities after incentive
payments cease. Similarly, results suggest that addi-
tional sequestration would range from 72 to 160 MMT
with incentive payments corresponding to $125 per ton
of permanent carbon sequestration. Permanent seques-
tration at these levels would offset 4 to 8 percent of
gross U.S. GHG emissions in 2001.
Total program payments during the contract period
range from $95 million to $2 billion per year under
the asset payment system, for net increases in carbon
sequestration ranging from 10 to 160 MMT per year.
If producers discontinue carbon-sequestering land
uses and management practices after the 15-year
contract period ends, the program will have generated
carbon sequestration worth only one-third of its
payments—because most of the carbon will be
released when the activities are terminated, and we
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third the emissions-mitigating value of permanent
carbon sequestration. At the $125-payment level, the
overpayment would be approximately $1.3 billion. By
contrast, the rental payment system pays only for the
time carbon remains sequestered. If producers discon-
tinue carbon-sequestering activities after contracts
end, no overpayment will have been made. Likewise,
if producers continue to renew their contracts and
maintain their carbon-sequestering activities, the
rental system will incur the same total cost as the
asset payment system but will have ensured perma-
nent sequestration.
The level of incentive payments also affects the type
and geographic distribution of changes in land use and
management practices because different sequestering
activities become economically feasible at different
incentive levels. At low levels of incentive payments
(corresponding to less than $25 per ton of permanent
carbon under the rental payment system), we estimate
that increased use of conservation tillage would be the
dominant source of additional sequestration. This effect
reflects the fact that returns from conservation tillage
systems are already close to returns from conventional
tillage systems in many areas. At higher incentive
payment levels, afforestation becomes the dominant
source of additional carbon sequestration in agriculture.
Land is drawn first from pasture. As incentives increase,
an increasing share of afforested land is drawn from
cropland (which is generally more productive than
pasture). Only at incentive levels of $125 per ton with
the asset payment system is a small amount of cropland
converted to grassland (assuming no additional incen-
tive, such as Conservation Reserve Program payments).
This pattern of adoption is consistent with earlier
economic studies using a variety of models and data
sources (e.g., Antle et al., 2001, and McCarl and
Schneider, 2001).
Regionally, most of the increase in conservation tillage
occurs in the Great Plains, Corn Belt, and Lake States.
Most afforestation occurs in the Southeast, the Delta
States, and Appalachia. The small amount of cropland
conversion to grassland (about 100,000 acres) occurs
in the Southern Plains.
Incentive levels are thus critical in determining how
much carbon will be sequestered, how it will be
sequestered, and where it will be sequestered. Even at
the highest incentive levels we analyzed, the economic
potential to sequester additional carbon in agricultural
soils and biomass is much less than the technical poten-
tial as indicated by soil science and forestry studies.
Estimated economic potentials are lower than estimated
technical potentials because our analysis incorporates
the costs and returns associated with different activities
and models the choices that farmers might make under
different incentive systems. We assume that producers
will adopt carbon-sequestering land uses and manage-
ment practices that are technically feasible only if they
are also economically feasible.
For conservation tillage, soil science studies (Lal et al.,
1998, and Eve et al., 2000) estimate a technical annual
carbon sequestration potential of 35-107 MMT. By
contrast, at incentive levels corresponding to $125 per
ton of additional carbon permanently sequestered, we
estimate that only about one-fourth (7-27 MMT) of
this technical potential would be economically
feasible. For afforestation, estimates derived from
Birdsey (1996) suggest a technical potential of 91-203
MMT; we estimate that only about two-thirds of this
potential (65-133 MMT) would be economically
feasible at incentives corresponding to $125 per ton of
carbon permanently sequestered. Technical and
economic potentials diverge the most for land use
change from cropland to permanent grasses: Eve et al.
(2000) estimate a technical potential of 26-54 MMT,
whereas we estimate that virtually none of this would
be economically feasible even at the highest incentive
levels considered.
Symmetry of Incentive Payments
Our reference scenario incorporates both “carrots” (in
the form of incentive payments to producers for addi-
tional carbon sequestered through changes in land use
and management practices) and “sticks” (in the form
of payments by producers for carbon emissions from
changes in activities). For comparison, we analyzed a
scenario using carrots alone.
Conservation tillage is the only activity that can be
reversed in our model, so the choice of tillage practice
is the only choice we analyze that could generate carbon
emissions. In the carrots-only scenario, net carbon
sequestration through conservation tillage is lower and
program costs significantly higher across all payment
levels. At incentive levels corresponding to $125 per ton
of carbon permanently sequestered, a carrots-only
system would sequester an additional 3.5 MMT at a
cost of $1.5 billion. By contrast, at equivalent incentive
levels, a system with both carrots and sticks would
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million—twice as much carbon at one-tenth the average
cost per ton.
Type of Incentive Payments
In another set of simulations, we included a 50-percent
cost-share subsidy for converting cropland to forest or
grassland, in addition to the incentive payments per ton
of carbon sequestered. Adding a cost-share subsidy does
not appear to improve substantially the cost effectiveness
of the incentive system. The cost-share subsidy would
increase sequestration at low carbon-payment levels but
not at high payment levels, and the incremental cost for
the incremental sequestration does not appear to be
lower than for the simple system. Furthermore, since the
cost-share applies only to land-use change activities, it
distorts the mix of carbon sequestration activities away
from changes in cropland management.
Limitations in the Present Analysis 
Leave Questions
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and biomass
is a low-cost technology for reducing the atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gases. These GHG miti-
gation activities can serve as a bridge from the present
to a time when new (low- or no-carbon) energy tech-
nologies are developed and adopted, or, alternatively,
when technologies for the capture, separation, and
storage of energy-related carbon emissions in other
sinks become cost effective. If future research on GHG
implications of land-management activities in the agri-
cultural sector shows, for example, that nitrous oxide
emissions could increase with carbon sequestration in
some activities, our results would overstate the net
reduction in total GHG emissions. Also, given that
afforestation appears to have the greatest potential for
additional sequestration, better understanding of
market linkages between agriculture and forestry over
an extended period is extremely important. McCarl et
al. (2003) suggest that the long-term dynamics are
complicated due to the feedback effects of substan-
tially increasing the supply of timber and, conse-
quently, dampening timber prices.
Finally, our analysis does not incorporate the institu-
tional costs associated with measuring, monitoring,
and crediting the carbon sequestered for the different
policy approaches. Though the costs are likely to vary
significantly depending on the features of the program
and the range of activities covered, at this point we
know very little about the cost structures. Full consid-
eration of transaction costs would likely show, in most
cases, that our present estimates of cost effectiveness
are higher than what would be experienced in real-
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Appendix 1:
Methods, Assumptions, and Key Results of Selected Carbon Sequestration Studies
Parks and Hardie (1995)
Empirical framework: Optimization model that differentiates U.S. farm lands by expected net returns to agri-
culture, expected net returns to forestry, and potential to sequester carbon in trees. Develops supply curves for
carbon sequestration on U.S. agricultural lands by exhausting a fixed budget to subsidize land-use change to
forest under various sequestration program designs. 
Geographic scope: 116.1 million acres of privately owned U.S. cropland and pasture classified as non-
prime farmland and suited to forest. Land is disaggregated into 433 regions with each
region linked to a forest type and thus a potential to sequester carbon. 
Baseline time period: A composite year reflecting the period 1985-90. 
Land base: Private agricultural land classified as not irrigated and not prime farmland. 
Activities analyzed: Shifting marginal cropland and pasture to forest.
Incentives analyzed: Derives carbon prices by exhausting fixed sequestration budget.
Program design and incentive structure:
● Afforestation program modeled after CRP. All land enrolled in year 1 for 10 years, after which the program
ends. Program provides 50 percent of tree-establishment costs paid in year 1 and annual rental payments equal
to forgone agricultural rents. 
● Pays for carbon in trees only.
● Scenarios analyzed:
S1: eligible land—cropland and pasture/objective—minimize cost per acre,
S2: eligible land—cropland and pasture/objective—minimize cost per ton of carbon,
S3 and S4—objectives similar to S1 and S2 but limited to cropland.
Assumptions, modeling issues, and special features:
● Land allocated to the use with the highest expected net return.
● Treatment of time—static. Model features a one-time decision to afforest lands without considering 
the implications of potential future harvest.
● Permanence—not explicitly considered. After 10 years, forestry is assumed to be the land use with the 
highest expected return (so annual payments are not needed to keep land in trees). 
● C-stock equilibrium (CSE)—not explicitly considered. Afforestation program ends before CSE occurs. 
Key results:
● For a program with a present value of $4.60 billion and targeting both cropland and pasture:
S1: Over 10-year program period, enrollment is 23.1 million acres, carbon sequestration is 40.8 MMT 
per year, average discounted costs = $112.54 per mt. 
S2: Over 10-year program period, enrollment is 22.2 million acres, carbon sequestration is 44.1 MMT 
per year, average discounted costs = $104.20 per mt. 
● For scenario S2, the marginal cost (MC) of sequestration rises slowly from 0 to 100 mt per year then increases
sharply.
● Enrollment and sequestration levels decrease more than 50 percent and costs more than double when only
cropland is targeted.52 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
Alig et al. (1999)
Empirical framework: Optimization model linking U.S. agriculture and forestry sectors through competition for
privately owned land. Agriculture modeled using ASM (see McCarl and Schneider). Forestry sector has nine
geographic regions, six product classes, two private land ownership classes, four forest types reflecting species
composition, three site productivity classes, four management intensity classes, and six classes reflecting land’s
ability to shift between sectors. Model is simulated in 10-year time steps, with ASM solved statically at each step. 
Geographic coverage: Contiguous 48 States. 
Baseline period: U.S. agricultural and forest sectors initially calibrated to 1990 conditions. Model is
then simulated in 10-year time steps through 2079, with no afforestation incentives
to set the baseline. Policy results are tracked through 2039. 
Land base: All agricultural and forest land in the contiguous 48 U.S. States. 
Activities analyzed: Shifting land between agriculture and forestry. 
Incentives analyzed: Sets payments to afforest agricultural lands at levels needed to achieve exogenously
specified afforestation levels. 
Program design and incentive structure:
● Programs start in 1990 and runs through 2079. 
● Carbon-sequestration program modeled as subsidy for afforestation. 
● Pays for incremental ecosystem carbon (carbon in trees, woody debris, understory, floor, and soil). 
Trees can be harvested with no deforestation penalty. 
● Scenarios:
S1: Force 12.1 million acres of agricultural land to shift to forest in decade 1 (1990-99). 
S2: Constant carbon flux of 1.61 gigatons per decade.
S3: Flux set 0.4 gigatons above baseline in each decade. 
S4: Flux starts at baseline level and increases 0.2 gigatons above baseline in each succeeding decade.
Assumptions, modeling issues, and special features:
● Land allocated to the use with the highest expected net return.
● Afforestation and forest management decisions affect sequestered carbon levels. 
● Framework accounts for interactions between the agricultural and forestry sectors. 
● Management of public forests specified exogenously and held fixed.
● Existing farm programs assumed to end after 1 decade.
● Treatment of time: Dynamic, using 10-year time steps and 4-percent discount rate.
● Permanence: Reflected in carbon accounting but not in pricing of sequestration incentives. 
● CSE: Forests generally harvested before CSE occurs. 
Key results:
● Policies to afforest agricultural lands will generate offsetting deforestation activities in the forest sector.
Over time, many lands will move back and forth between agriculture and forestry.
● Across the three carbon flux scenarios (S2-S4) 
Net transfers of land from agriculture to forest, relative to the baseline, range between 8.4 million acres 
and 21.4 million acres over the period 1990-2039. 
Over the 90-year simulation, in terms of the net present value:
Society welfare decreases between $22.7 billion and $55.8 billion,
Domestic agricultural producers gain between $13.5 billion and $44.3 billion,
Domestic agricultural consumers lose between $34.4 billion and $83.9 billion,
Domestic forest producers and consumers gain and lose depending on the scenario.Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 53
Stavins (1999)
Empirical framework: Econometric model describing the shares of county land in forest and in agriculture.
Explanatory variables include agricultural rents, farm production costs, existing forest area, tree-establishment
costs, conversion to cropland costs, and net returns for a one-time forest harvest. Simulates afforestation
programs by exogenously increasing forest rents and deforestation costs. Uses changes in forest area and age to
estimate changes in carbon sequestered. Estimates regional marginal cost curve for sequestered carbon by
subtracting baseline sequestration from sequestration at different levels of an afforestation subsidy/deforestation
tax.
Geographic scope: Delta States (Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi).
Baseline period: Model estimated with panel data for 36 counties/parishes covering period 1935-84.
Baseline scenario derived by simulating the model over 90-year period with the
afforestation payment/deforestation tax set equal to zero.
Land base: Agricultural and forest land
Activities analyzed: Shifting agricultural land into forest. 
Incentives analyzed: Exogenously specifies a range of afforestation payments/deforestation penalties.
Program design and incentive structure
● Carbon-sequestration program modeled as subsidy for afforestation and a tax for deforestation. 
● Pays for ecosystem carbon (carbon in trees, woody debris, understory, floor, and soil). 
● Model simulations run for 90 years. 
Assumptions, modeling issues, and special features:
● Landowners maximize the expected longrun return to land. 
● Framework accounts for factors that may make landowners require a premium to shift land to forest. 
● Sequestered carbon given in present value terms to account for the time profile of sequestration.
● Treatment of time: Dynamic using annual time step and 5-percent discount rate. 
● Permanence: Explicitly accounted for—agents paid when they afforest and penalized when they deforest. 
● CSE: Not an issue. Trees can be harvested at any time (and generally are harvested before reaching CSE). 
Key results:
● For Delta States, MC of sequestering carbon rises gradually and linearly to 6.4 million mt per year. At that
level: MC = $79.86 per mt, net afforestation is 4.6 million acres, carbon tax/subsidy = $109.87 per acre. 
● Above 6.4 million mt, MC of carbon sequestration increases steeply becoming nearly asymptotic at about 
14.5 million mt.
● For low levels of net GHG emission reduction, sequestration costs are similar to abatement cost.54 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
Plantinga et al. (1999)
Empirical framework: Econometric land-use model describing the shares of county land in forest, agriculture,
and other uses. Key explanatory variables include agricultural and forest rents, population density, and two
measures of land quality. Simulates afforestation programs by exogenously increasing forest rents. Uses changes
in forest area to estimate changes in carbon sequestered. 
Geographic scope: Models estimated for Maine (ME), South Carolina (SC), and Wisconsin (WI).
Baseline time period: Data cover period 1971-96. Baseline scenario derived by simulating the model over 60-
year period with afforestation payments set equal to zero. 
Land base: Private agricultural and forest land in ME, SC, and southern two-thirds of WI.
Activities analyzed: Shifting agricultural land into forest.
Incentives analyzed: Exogenously specifies a range of afforestation payments.
Program design and incentive structure:
● Afforestation program modeled after CRP. 
● Starts in 2000 and runs for 60 years in 10-year steps. 
● Landowners decide to enroll, leave program, or reenroll at the start of each decade.
● Provides annual fixed payment and one-time tree establishment costs paid in year of enrollment. 
No penalty for deforestation. 
● In each State, enrollment capped at 25 percent of its agricultural land. 
● Scenarios analyzed:
S1—Constant 1995 population, uniform payments, harvests allowed.
S2—Constant 1995 population, uniform payments, harvests not allowed.
S3—Increasing population, variable payments, harvests not allowed. 
S4—Increasing population, uniform payments, harvests allowed. 
Assumptions, modeling issues, and special features:
● Landowners maximize the expected longrun return to land. 
● Framework accounts for factors that may make landowners require a premium to shift land to forest. 
● Without afforestation, net sequestration on agricultural lands is zero. 
● Land in urban/other uses held fixed implying only agricultural land shifts to forest. 
● Sequestered carbon given in present value terms to account for the time profile of sequestration. 
● Treatment of time: Dynamic in 10-year time steps and 5-percent discount rate.
● Permanence: Not accounted for—agents are paid to afforest but are not penalized for deforesting. 
● CSE: Not an issue. Forests in ME, SC, and WI do not reach CSE in 60 years. 
Key results:
● Across scenarios, the MC of carbon sequestration rises (almost) linearly from the origin. At 25 percent 
enrollment cap, the MC of sequestration varies:
From $107.10 to $135.28 per mt in ME (sequestration = 3.176 million mt),
From $50.73 to $101.46 per mt in SC (sequestration = 14.518 million mt),
From $84.55 to $107.10 per mt in WI (sequestration = 54.444 million mt). 
● S1 is almost always least-cost scenario.
● Lake States and Midwest are the most cost-effective areas to afforest; the Northeast is the least 
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Antle et al. (2001) 
Empirical framework: Field-level econometric production models for winter wheat, spring wheat, and barley
in continuous cropping and crop-fallow rotations and permanent grass. Incorporates these models into a simula-
tion model that sets farmer decisions on land allocation and input use in response to exogenous policy shocks. 
A crop ecosystem model (Century) then determines the net effect on soil carbon.
Geographic scope: Eastern Montana’s dryland grain-producing region. 
Baseline time period: Data are from mid-1990s. Baseline scenario derived by simulating the model 
over 20-year period with sequestration payments set equal to zero. 
Land base: Privately owned cropland and pasture. 
Activities analyzed: Switching cropland to permanent grasses. 
Switch from crop-fallow rotations or permanent grass to continuous cropping.
Incentives Analyzed: $2.07 to 20.71 per acre to adopt continuous cropping.
$5.18 to $51.77 per acre to shift land to permanent grasses.
Program design and incentive structure:
● Provide payments to farmers to adopt continuous cropping and shift land to permanent grass (activities
are analyzed separately).
● Payments for shifting land to grasses are in addition to CRP payments. 
● Simulations begin today and run for 20 years. 
● Scenarios analyzed (and discussed):
PG: switch land to permanent grasses—all cropland and pasture is eligible,
CC: shift to continuous cropping—only lands in crop fallow rotations and grasses are eligible.
Assumptions, modeling issues, and special features:
● Landowners maximize the expected returns to each field. 
● Use of site-level data (i.e., field and farm) accounts for the spatial heterogeneity in biophysical and
economic characteristics across farms. 
● Permanence: Not accounted for. 
● CSE: Not accounted for. Program ends before reaching CSE. 
● Treatment of time: Static.
Key results:
● Spatial heterogeneity with respect to biophysical and economic characteristics is an important
consideration in the design of farm policies to sequester carbon. Across locations in the study area, the MC 
of sequestering carbon ranges from $51.15 to $511.51 per mt in the PG scenario and from $12.28 to $143.22 
per mt in the CC scenario. In the CC scenario, the average cost of sequestering carbon was less than $51.15
per mt in all regions. 
● From the taxpayer viewpoint, a policy to promote CC is relatively more efficient at sequestering soil 
carbon than a PG policy. Over 20 years, the PG policy that pays farmers $51.77 per acre per year sequesters 
7 MMT of carbon at an undiscounted Government cost of $3.15 billion. Over 20 years, the CC policy pays
farmers $4.14 per acre per year to sequester 7.61 MMT at a Government cost of $206.34 million. 
● Over the range of payments considered, soil carbon sequestration ranges from 2.37 to 6.76 MMT under the 
PG scenario and from 7.61 to 18.25 MMT under the CC policy. 
● For CC policy, payments above $20.71 per acre do not significantly increase carbon sequestration because 
over 90 percent of land in crop-fallow rotations has been converted to CC.56 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
Pautsch et al. (2001) 
Empirical framework: Estimates an econometric model where the probability of adopting no-till is a function
of net returns to conventional tillage, local soil characteristics, and regional temperature and precipitation vari-
ables. Production possibilities include 14 rotations consisting of mixes of corn, soybeans, wheat, sorghum, and
hay. Econometric model is linked with a biophysical model so that changes in tillage practices can be paired
with changes in soil carbon. 
Geographic scope: Iowa.
Baseline time period: Model reflects a “typical” year during the 1990s. 
Land base: All cropland.
Activities analyzed: Adopting conservation tillage (CC)—assumed to be no-till. 
Incentives analyzed: Specifies various levels of carbon sequestration and computes the average costs per ton
needed to achieve those levels. 
Program design and incentive structure:
● Provide payments to farmers to adopt conservation tillage (assumed to be no-till). 
● Scenarios considered:
S1: new CC adopters only with uniform per acre payment. 
S2: all CC adopters with uniform per acre payment.
S3: new CC adopters with price discriminating per acre payment based on carbon-sequestration potential. 
S4: all CC adopters with price discriminating per acre payment based on carbon-sequestration potential.
Assumptions, modeling issues, and special features:
● Landowners maximize the expected returns to land. 
● Use of site-level data (i.e., field and farm) accounts for the spatial heterogeneity in biophysical and
economic characteristics across farms. 
● Framework addresses the issue of designing programs to pay all adopters of conservation tillage versus 
only paying those who adopt as a result of the incentives. 
● Treatment of time: Static—looks at an average year of an unspecified multiyear program. 
● Permanence: Not accounted for. 
● CSE: Not accounted for. Implicitly assumes carbon will accumulate as long as the program runs. 
Key results:
● At a sequestration level of 1 MMT per year, the average cost per mt sequestered is about $294 in 
S1, $1,089 in S2, $207 in S3, and $686 in S4. 
Regardless of payment design, the average cost per mt sequestered falls when only new adopters
are targeted.
Regardless of who is targeted, the average cost per mt sequestered falls with a price-discriminating
payment.Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 57
McCarl and Schneider (2001)
Empirical framework: The ASMGHG model—a market and spatial equilibrium mathematical programming
model. Model depicts production and consumption in 63 U.S. regions for 22 traditional crop commodities, 3
biofuel crops, 29 livestock commodities, and more than 60 processed agricultural products. Trade is modeled for
28 international regions. In responding to relative changes in input prices, farmers can adjust tillage, fertilization,
irrigation, manure treatment, and feed mixes. Changes in carbon sequestration associated with changes in crop-
management activities are calculated using the biophysical model EPIC (Environmental Policy Integrated
Climate model). Land shifting from agriculture to forestry and the associated carbon sequestration are obtained
from 30-year simulations of FASOM (see Alig et al., 1999). Changes in emissions associated with livestock
management based on EPA data. 
Geographic scope: Contiguous 48 States. 
Baseline time period: ASMGHG run with carbon valued at $0.00 per mt. 
Land base: All agricultural land (cropland and pasture).
Activities analyzed: Afforestation and forest management, biofuel production, crop mix changes,
changes in tillage practices, reductions in fertilizer use, reductions in rice acres,
grassland conversions, changes in irrigation practices, changes in livestock
management, and changes in manure management. 
Incentives analyzed: Exogenously specifies range of carbon prices. 
Program design and incentive structure:
● Farmers paid for changes in land use and production practices that sequester carbon, increase biofuel
production, or reduce GHG emissions. Farmers taxed for changes in land use or production practices that
increase GHG emissions.
● Scenarios considered: ASMGHG simulated with carbon valued at $9.60, $48.10, $96.20, and $480.80 per mt
(or $10, $50, $100, and $500 per mt in 2000 dollars).
Assumptions, modeling issues, and special features:
● Land allocated to the use with the highest expected net return. 
● Simulations reflect points of market equilibrium. Simulations do not account for adjustment paths. 
● Treatment of time: Static—economic agents and markets adjust fully and instantly to incentives for
sequestering carbon, reducing CH4 and N2O emissions, and producing biofuels. 
● Permanence: Not explicitly accounted for. Payments for carbon sequestration activities implicitly assume
carbon is stored permanently. 
● CSE: Not explicitly accounted for. 
● Leakage: Explicitly accounted for (see empirical framework above and Alig et al, 1999). 
Key results:
● For carbon valued at $9.60, $48.10, $96.20, and $480.80 per mt:
Carbon sequestration is 51.80, 146.40, 238.50, and 395.50 MMT of carbon, respectively.
Total mitigation is 53.90, 154.10, 255.70, and 425.90 MMTCE, respectively.
Gross farm welfare increases $0.4 billion, $4.3 billion, $13.4 billion, and $76.9 billion, respectively.
U.S. consumer welfare decreases $0.4 billion, $5.2 billion, $18.5 billion, and $104.6 billion, respectively.  
● At low carbon prices, soil carbon sequestration, afforestation, and CH4/N2O emissions reductions
activities dominate a national GHG-mitigation strategy.
● At high carbon prices, afforestation and biofuel production dominate a national GHG-mitigation strategy.
● The total contribution of CH4 and N2O emissions reductions activities is relatively small.58 ● Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 Economic Research Service/USDA
Parks and Hardie use acres, short tons, and 1987 dollars; Alig et al. use hectares, metric tons, and 1990 dollars;
Stavins uses acres, short tons, and 1990 dollars; Plantinga et al. use acres, short tons, and 1995 dollars; Antle et
al. use hectares, metric tons, and 1995 dollars; Pautsch et al. use acres, metric tons, and 1992 dollars; and
McCarl and Schneider use acres, metric tons, and 2000 dollars. All reported monetary values have been
converted to 1997 dollars, all area measures have been converted to acres, and all GHG emission
reduction/carbon sequestration quantities have been converted to metric tons of carbon.Economic Research Service/USDA Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S. Agricultural Sector / TB-1909 ● 59
Appendix 2: Afforestation of cropland and pasture by region, policy scenario,
and carbon-payment level
Land North- Lake Corn Appa- South- Delta Mountain &T o t al
afforested east States Belt lachia east States Great Plains PacificU .S.
Million acres
Scenario 1 (Rental carbon payment, net sequestration, no cost-share):
C Price=$10:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
From pasture 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Total afforested   0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
C Price=$25:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .00 .40 .3 0.40 .00 .01 .1
From pasture 0.00 .00 .00 .01 .9 2.20 .00 .04 .1
Total afforested   0.00 .00 .00 .42 .22 .60 .00 .05 .2
C Price=$50:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .02 .11 .11 .20 .00 .04 .4
From pasture 0.00 .3 0.05 .9 10.08 .00 .00 .02 4 .2
Total afforested   0.00 .3 0.08 .01 1 .1 9.20 .00 .02 8 .6
C Price=$75:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .0 3.51 .81 .60 .00 .06 .9
From pasture 0.00 .80 .81 0 .61 2 .47 .70 .00 .0 32.3
Total afforested   0.00 .80 .81 4 .11 4 .2 9.3 0.00 .0 39.2
C Price=$100
From cropland 0 .00 .10 .0 3.9 2.62 .10 .00 .08 .7
From pasture 0.12 .41 .11 0 .81 3.67 .50 .04 .84 0 .4
Total afforested   0.12 .51 .11 4 .71 6 .2 9.60 .04 .84 9.1
C Price=$125:
From cropland 0 .3 2.10 .04 .3 3.3 2.60 .00 .01 2 .7
From pasture 1.24 .11 .41 1 .01 3.67 .40 .01 3.25 1 .9
Total afforested   1.56 .21 .41 5 .41 6 .9 10.00 .01 2 .26 4 .6
Scenario 2  (Asset carbon payment, net sequestration, no cost-share):
C Price=$10:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .00 .60 .40 .60 .00 .01 .7
From pasture 0.00 .00 .00 .0 3.0 3.70 .00 .06 .7
Total afforested   0.00 .00 .00 .6 3.44 .3 0.00 .08 .4
C Price=$25:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .0 3.41 .71 .60 .00 .06 .6
From pasture 0.00 .70 .01 0 .71 2 .17 .80 .00 .0 31.2
Total afforested   0.00 .70 .01 4 .11 3.8 9.40 .00 .0 37.8
C Price=$50:
From cropland 0 .3 2.10 .04 .6 3.82 .9 0.00 .01 3.8
From pasture 1.64 .81 .51 1 .11 3.67 .40 .01 8 .75 8 .6
Total afforested   1.9 6.9 1.51 5 .71 7 .41 0 .3 0.01 8 .77 2 .4
C Price=$75:
From cropland 0 .42 .3 0.05 .9 5.24 .3 0.00 .01 8 .1
From pasture 2.67 .5 3.21 1 .11 3.66 .60 .04 2 .9 87.5
Total afforested   3.0 9.8 3.21 7 .01 8 .81 0 .9 0.04 2 .9 105.6
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Appendix 2: Afforestation of cropland and pasture by region, policy scenario,
and carbon-payment level—Continued
Land North- Lake Corn Appa- South- Delta Mountain &T o t al
afforested east States Belt lachia east States Great Plains PacificU .S.
Million acres
Scenario 2  (Full carbon payment, net sequestration, no cost-share):--continued
C Price=$100:
From cropland 0 .6 3.00 .07 .15 .85 .9 0.00 .02 2 .5
From pasture 4.77 .57 .51 1 .21 3.66 .10 .05 4 .8 105.4
Total afforested   5.3 10.57 .51 8 .3 19.41 2 .00 .05 4 .8 127.9
C Price=$125:
From cropland 1 .2 3.70 .08 .46 .18 .00 .00 .02 7 .4
From pasture 4.77 .51 1 .3 11.01 3.6 3.10 .05 4 .8 106.1
Total afforested   5.9 11.21 1 .3 19.41 9.71 1 .10 .05 4 .81 33.5
Scenario 3 (Rental carbon payment, net sequestration, with cost-share):
C Price=$10:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .10 .00 .00 .00 .1
From pasture 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .80 .00 .02 .9
Total afforested   0.00 .00 .00 .00 .12 .80 .00 .0 3.0
C Price=$25:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .00 .9 0.50 .70 .00 .02 .1
From pasture 0.00 .00 .01 .45 .18 .40 .00 .01 4 .9
Total afforested 0.00 .00 .02 .3 5.6 9.10 .00 .01 7 .0
C Price=$50:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .02 .61 .3 1.20 .00 .05 .0
From pasture 0.00 .3 0.0 9.9 11.3 7.9 0.00 .02 9.5
Total afforested   0.00 .3 0.01 2 .51 2 .6 9.10 .00 .0 34.5
C Price=$75:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .0 3.52 .01 .60 .00 .07 .1
From pasture 0.10 .9 1.01 0 .61 3.27 .50 .00 .0 33.3
Total afforested   0.10 .9 1.01 4 .11 5 .2 9.10 .00 .04 0 .4
C Price=$100:
From cropland 0 .3 0.60 .0 3.9 2.82 .10 .00 .0 9.7
From pasture 0.51 .81 .21 0 .61 3.67 .40 .01 0 .64 5 .7
Total afforested   0.82 .41 .21 4 .51 6 .4 9.50 .01 0 .65 5 .4
C Price=$125:
From cropland 0 .3 2.10 .04 .3 3.52 .60 .00 .01 2 .8
From pasture 1.3 3.11 .41 0 .81 3.67 .10 .01 8 .9 56.3
Total afforested   1.65 .21 .41 5 .11 7 .1 9.70 .01 8 .9 69.2
Scenario 4 (Rental carbon payment, gross sequestration, no cost-share):
C Price=$10:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
From pasture 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
Total afforested   0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .0
C Price=$25:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .00 .40 .3 0.40 .00 .01 .1
From pasture 0.00 .00 .00 .01 .9 2.20 .00 .04 .1
Total afforested   0.00 .00 .00 .42 .22 .60 .00 .05 .2
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Appendix 2: Afforestation of cropland and pasture by region, policy scenario,
and carbon-payment level—Continued
Land North- Lake Corn Appa- South- Delta Mountain &T o t al
afforested east States Belt lachia east States Great Plains PacificU .S.
Million acres
Scenario 4 (Rental carbon payment, gross sequestration, no cost-share):--continued
C Price=$50:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .02 .11 .11 .20 .00 .04 .4
From pasture 0.00 .3 0.05 .9 10.07 .9 0.00 .02 4 .1
Total afforested   0.00 .3 0.08 .01 1 .1 9.10 .00 .02 8 .5
C Price=$75:
From cropland 0 .00 .00 .0 3.51 .81 .60 .00 .06 .9
From pasture 0.00 .80 .71 0 .61 2 .47 .40 .00 .0 31.9
Total afforested   0.00 .80 .71 4 .11 4 .2 9.00 .00 .0 38.8
C Price=$100:
From cropland 0 .00 .10 .0 3.9 2.62 .10 .00 .08 .7
From pasture 0.11 .41 .11 0 .21 3.67 .00 .04 .8 38.1
Total afforested   0.11 .51 .11 4 .11 6 .2 9.10 .04 .84 6 .8
C Price=$125:
From cropland 0 .3 2.10 .04 .3 3.3 2.60 .00 .01 2 .7
From pasture 0.42 .61 .41 0 .11 3.66 .80 .01 3.24 8 .1
Total afforested   0.74 .71 .41 4 .41 6 .9 9.40 .01 3.26 0 .8
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.